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A version of this Article appeared as a Chapter of the 2002 Economic
Report of the President, prepared by the Council of Economic Advisers.
The Council was established by the Employment Act of 1946 to provide the
President with objective economic analysis and advice on the development
and implementation of a wide range of domestic and international
economic policy issues. The Council also prepares the Economic Report of
the President for Congress on an annual basis. One of the goals of this
year's report was to examine closely the institutional foundation for the
economic growth of the last two decades. This period saw private sector
technological advances and entrepreneurial innovation that fueled
productivity growth and improvements in our standard of living. The 2002
Report analyzes this economic success and proposes strategies for
carrying sustained growth and broadened prosperity into the future.
One source of the United States's superior economic performance
over the past decade has been the success of its institutions in promoting
open, competitive markets. The task of competition policy, as detailed in
this Article, is to promote competition in a way that ensures the efficient
allocation of resources and serves the interests of consumers. In doing so,
however, competition policy must walk a fine line: efforts to prevent
anticompetitive changes in the behavior and organization of firms may
inadvertently stifle efficient innovation and so harm consumers rather than
benefit them.
The first three parts of this Article survey the landscape of modern
business and the policy lessons to be taken from recent experience. A
recurrent theme is that insights can be gained by combining the corporate
governance and antitrust literatures. Part I describes contemporary
developments in the organization of firms-emphasizing mergers, joint
ventures and partial equity stakes-and analyzes the motivations for such
changes in terms of their capacity to lower transaction costs in general,
and agency costs in particular. Part H describes the evolution of public
policy toward mergers through the last three decades, paying particular
attention to the growing influence of economic analysis. A number of more
t A version of this Article appeared as Chapter 3 of the 2002 Economic Report of the
President, under the title Realizing Gains from Competition.
"! This Article was authored by Randall S. Kroszner, Wallace P. Mullin, Judson L. Jaffe,
and Cindy R. Alexander, respectively, Member, Senior Economist, Staff Economist, Council of
Economic Advisers, and Economic, Department of Justice. In addition to those of its authors, the
Article reflects contributions by numerous executive agencies and departments.
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specific policy lessons figure into Part III. Partial equity stakes and joint
ventures are reconsidered, as are traditional views in evaluating the
efficiencies of corporate reorganization. Throughout, the emphasis is on
using real-world experience and contemporary scholarly insights to
recommend policies that promote and do not hinder competitive efficiency.
Parts IV and V treat two issues increasingly at the forefront of
competition policy today: global enterprise and dynamic competition. The
former is gaining in importance and attention as world markets grow
increasingly integrated and. firms respond by changing their
organizational forms. Our competition policy must take international
business into account, both in formulating an appropriate domestic policy
framework and in encouraging competition policy convergence around
best practices among the various national jurisdictions. Part V, dealing
with dynamic competition, discusses policy responses to sectors in which
firms compete not just for increments of market share but for absolute (if
temporary) market dominance through rapid innovation. Competition
authorities must recognize that, at any given moment, high profits and
substantial market share-indicators that might warrant concern about
competition in some industries-need not preclude vigorous dynamic
competition among firms in industries undergoing rapid technical change.
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Introduction
The organization of the firms that contribute to our nation's economic
output is constantly in flux. Some changes in organization are limited to a
firm's internal operations, as when firms develop innovative ways to
produce an existing good or service, or introduce incentives that encourage
workers to be more efficient. Other organizational changes involve
changing a firm's size or scope. This might include expanding production
or offering new goods or services to gain a greater share of a market or to
broaden the firm's geographic reach. Finally, firms may alter their
relationships with other firms that supply them, buy from them, or
compete with them. For instance, they might merge to combine operations
with a former rival, or outsource some part of their operations to another
firm.
Yale Journal on Regulation
Some of these changes may be quite visible to consumers. They may
change the names of companies with which consumers have become
familiar. They may even affect the types of products available in the
market. Other changes may be less visible.
At the same time, the overall composition of the economy is also
undergoing constant change. In particular, high-technology industries such
as biotechnology and information technology have become a much more
prominent part of the economy than they were even a decade ago.'
Innovations are central to the success of the firms that make up these
industries. These innovations have brought us remarkably more powerful
computers, more effective drug therapies, and much else.
One might naturally ask what the federal government's role in the
economy should be in light of these ongoing changes in the organization of
firms and the composition of the economy. The vast majority of firms face
healthy competition from other firms. A great virtue of this competition is
that it yields a number of benefits for consumers without the need for
government to intervene in the day-to-day decisions of firms. First,
competition keeps prices low. Competition in its various forms
discourages any one firm from raising prices above what others would
charge for similar goods or services. Second, competition ensures that only
those firms that can meet consumer demands at the lowest possible cost
will remain viable. Finally, competition encourages innovation in products
and services, as well as in production and distribution methods, among
other things.
Many of the organizational adjustments that firms undertake are
necessary responses to changing conditions, as competition motivates
them to constantly seek ways to lower their costs and improve their
products. But, in some limited cases, these changes in organization may
have the effect of reducing the vigor of competition. Recognizing this
possibility, since the end of the 19th century, all three branches of the
federal government have contributed to the development of antitrust
policy, a particularly important component of competition policy.
Three laws passed by Congress form the statutory basis of antitrust
policy in the United States. Together, the Sherman Act of 1890,2 the
Clayton Act of 1914,3 and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 19144 set
forth broad principles forbidding behavior or changes in the organization
I See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, DIGITAL
ECONOMY 2000 (2000); BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, EDITORS' AND REPORTERS'
GUIDE TO BIOTECHNOLOGY (5th ed. 2001), available at http://www.bio.org/aboutbio/guide200l/
letter.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2002).
2 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)).
3 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2000)).
4 Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 41 (2000)).
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and relationships of firms that may harm competition. The specific
implications of these laws have evolved as federal courts have interpreted
their broad principles in deciding cases brought before them.5 Two federal
agencies, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), actively enforce these laws. Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts,
private individuals and firms may also bring suit against firms they believe
are engaged in anticompetitive practices. As the courts consider each new
case, they are given an opportunity to further refine their interpretation of
these antitrust laws.
Competition policy seeks to prevent behavior and changes in the
organization and relationships of firms that may harm competition and
therefore consumers. But the fundamental challenge in developing
competition policy is to ensure that government measures intended to
accomplish this goal do not inadvertently prevent the other, more
beneficial behavior and changes that firms undertake. To do so would
handicap the ability of firms to lower their costs, improve their products,
and thereby benefit consumers and society generally.
This Article examines the various motivations for changes in the
organization of firms, and the resulting implications for competition
policy. It begins by focusing on what motivates a firm to combine its
assets with those of other firms or to take a financial interest in them.
Taking as a starting point the progress that has been made in policies
relating to mergers, the Article then discusses how economic ideas and
analysis have been and can continue to be incorporated in the ongoing
refinement of competition policy. Next, in view of the increasingly global
markets in which firms compete, the Article addresses how the
international nature of competition and of some firms' operations can
affect both the motivations for changes in their organization and the
impact of other nations' competition policies on our economy. Finally, the
Article addresses the implications for competition policy of the
increasingly prominent role of innovation-intensive industries in the
economy.
The longstanding core principles of U.S. competition policy remain
sound. But competition policy continues to evolve to recognize changes in
modern firm structures, market competition, dynamic forms of
competition, and advances in our knowledge of the effects of firm
behavior. This evolution is proceeding along several fronts. First, because
firms today are engaging not only in mergers, but also in hybrid
organizational forms such as partial acquisitions and joint ventures, policy
must be sensitive to the efficiency gains these forms of organization create.
5 For a general discussion of the evolving interpretation of antitrust law see William
Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON.
PERSP., 43 (2000); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001).
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Second, because firms' activities, and therefore national competition
policies, more frequently cross international borders than in the past,
inefficient competition policies in any one nation may impose costs on
firms and consumers worldwide. The United States is pursuing
harmonization of these policies in a way that will spread best practice and
efficient competition policy to all countries. Finally, industries
characterized by active innovation and dynamic competition are raising
new issues for competition policy, which must respond in ways that foster
this innovative activity and maximize the resulting benefits to society.
I. Motivations for Organizational Change
Firms may change their organization for any of a number of reasons.
One of the fundamental forces driving the behavior of firms is the desire to
maximize their profits. This leads firms to strive constantly to minimize
the costs and maximize the value of the goods and services they produce.
Meanwhile, developments in individual markets and the broader
economy are constantly changing the costs associated with each of the
various ways that firms can choose to organize their operations. These
developments may also alter the business opportunities they face, perhaps
opening new markets or affecting the competition they encounter. In the
past two decades, some of the most significant of these developments have
been improvements in the power and reductions in the costs of information
technology; deregulation of certain industries; and the globalization of
markets.6 These or other developments may make it profitable for firms to
alter their organization or operations.
7
The work of Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase provides a
framework for understanding how and why firms might restructure their
organizations in response to developments such as these.8 Coase views a
firm's operations, internal and external, as a set of transactions, whether it
be obtaining materials for production or arranging for the promotion of the
firm's products. To maximize its profits, the firm will seek to minimize the
cost of each of these transactions. These costs are influenced in part by
whether the transaction is performed within the firm or with another party
on the open market. The relative costs of these two options will largely
6 See, e.g., Randall S. Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The
Development of Derivatives Clearing Houses and Recent Over-the-Counter Innovation, 31 J. MONEY
CREDIT & BANKING 596 (1999) (commenting on the impact of these factors on the organization and
structure of financial derivatives markets and institutions).
7 For additional profit factors driving firms to change their structure, see Randall S.
Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajan, Organization Structure and Credibility: Evidence from Commercial
Bank Securities Activities Before the Glass-Steagall Act, 39 J. MONETARY ECON. 475 (1997).
8 See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted in
READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 331 (George Stigler & Kenneth Boulding eds., 1952).
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determine which one the firm will choose. When developments in its
markets or in the broader economy change these relative costs, the firm
will review these options and may decide to change an internal transaction
to an external one, or vice versa. The result is a change in its
organizational structure. For instance, a firm may perceive an opportunity
to outsource some of its inventory management to another firm that
specializes in that task. But if this task needs to be closely integrated with
other operations in the firm, outsourcing may become preferable only
when communications costs fall below some threshold. In this Article, we
address the fact that firms today face more than just two alternatives in
choosing how to organize their operations. We highlight some of the
alternatives that constitute particularly important developments in the
organization of firms and industries for the future.
A. The Role ofAgency Costs in Organizational Change
Agency costs are an important component of costs that a firm can
lower by adjusting its organizational structure. 9 They can arise whenever
one person or firm (the agent) contracts to perform certain tasks for
another (the principal). Differing incentives facing the two parties, coupled
with the inability of the principal to costlessly monitor the agent's actions,
cause the latter to perform the contracted tasks in a way that does not best
serve the principal's interest. Ultimately, a firm's owners (in the case of a
corporation, its shareholders) are those most interested in maximizing its
profits. Not only are they the residual claimants on the firm's profits, but
the value of their shares is affected by expectations of those profits today
and in the future. Yet there are many others, both within and outside the
firm, whose actions affect the firm's profits but who do not benefit enough
from an increase in those profits to make maximizing them their only
objective.
For example, the decisions of a firm's chief executive officer (CEO)
can clearly have a significant effect on the firm's profits. Although the
CEO may be interested in maximizing those profits, he or she may also
have other, conflicting objectives: perhaps the CEO would like to increase
his or her perquisites by purchasing a company jet, even though that would
not be an efficient allocation of the firm's resources. Because the CEO
runs the firm's day-to-day operations, the CEO is an agent of the firm's
9 A substantial body of economic literature has developed on agency costs, or agency
theory more generally. While its roots are in the economics literature on asymmetric information, one
of the seminal articles on this subject, applied to businesses, is Michael Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 303 (1976). For an overview of the literature and excerpts from key articles, see THE ECONOMIC
NATURE OF THE FIRM: A READER (Louis Putterman & Randall S. Kroszner eds., 2d ed. 1996).
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shareholders, and the cost associated with the CEO's pursuit of interests
aside from profit maximization is an agency cost. This cost arises from the
separation of ownership of the firm from control of it.' 0
Just as they may choose to outsource an operation in order to
minimize costs, so, too, may shareholders alter the organization of their
firm in order to reduce these agency costs." Certain internal institutional
arrangements can serve to better align owner and manager incentives. For
publicly traded corporations, a commonly used compensation package for
CEOs and other senior managers consists of "pay for performance":
executive pay is determined in part by bonuses based on sales or profits,
often coupled with the grant of stock options. 2 When managers own stock
or stock options in the company they manage, their interests become more
aligned with the shareholders' interests. One study found that, with the
recent dramatic increases in such forms of compensation, the average
effect of a change in the value of a firm on its CEO's wealth grew by
almost a factor of ten between 1980 and 1998." Clearly, pay for
performance has become an increasingly prominent feature of corporate
life, suggesting that it may prove a valuable way for shareholders to reduce
agency costs.
In addition to the CEO, many other individuals and entities influence
a firm's profits, and so a comprehensive definition of agency costs must
include costs due to their actions as well. Therefore, changes in the
organization of firms designed to reduce agency costs may extend well
beyond arrangements for compensating managers. For instance, if the
actions of a particular supplier can significantly affect a firm's profits, the
firm may seek to arrange its relationship with that supplier in a way that
aligns the supplier's interests more closely with those of the firm's
shareholders. Much as in the case of pay for performance contracts, this
may be achieved by having the supplier hold stock in the firm.
B. Mergers
One of the most visible manifestations of changes in the organization
of firms is the growing number and value of mergers and acquisitions.
10 See Clifford Holdemess, Randall S. Kroszner & Dennis Sheehan, Were the Good Old
Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression, 54 J. FIN. 435
(1999), for a discussion of the theory and evidence on how the separation of ownership and control has
evolved over time.
II See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737
(1997), for a broad survey of mechanisms for addressing agency costs in firms.
12 For a summary of the theoretical and empirical research on executive compensation and
trends in pay practices, see Kevin Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMICS 2485 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999).
13 See Brian Hall & Jeffrey Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, in 14 TAX
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1 (James Poterba ed., 2000).
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During the second half of the 1990s, the United States witnessed a
remarkable surge in merger activity. (See Figure 1.) Indeed, even with the
economic slowdown, merger activity in 2001 was well above average
levels during the past three decades.
14
Figure 1. Announced Mergers and Acquisitions
Involving U.S.-Headquartered Firms.
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Although mergers and acquisitions increased in number and value during the 1980s, activity since
the mid-1990s has far surpassed this earlier wave. Note: Includes publicly announced mergers and
acquisitions of$1 million and greater that involved at least ten percent of the target firm's equity.
Value is the base equity price offered.
Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), Mergerstat, and Council of
Economic Advisers
In a significant share of mergers today, one or both parties are firms
with operations in more than one country, and many mergers even involve
firms with headquarters in different countries. These are often referred to
as cross-border mergers. In 2001, twenty-nine percent of all announced
mergers and acquisitions in which a U.S.-headquartered firm was a party
also involved either a foreign buyer or a foreign seller.' 5 This was a
markedly higher percentage than was common during much of the 1970s
and 1980s. (See Figure 2.)
14 See 2002 Mergerstat Review, http://www.mergerstat.com (last visited Jan. 1, 2002).
15 Id.
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Figure 2. Fraction of U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions
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Compared with most of the 1980s, recent years have witnessed a greater proportion of cross-
border mergers. Note: Includes publicly announced mergers and acquisitions of $1 million and
greater that involve at least ten percent of the target firm's equity. Foreign is defined here as
having headquarters outside the United States.
Source: Mergerstat.
Although general economic theory and empirical research provide a
broad framework within which to understand organizational changes
across firm boundaries, such as mergers, a substantial body of research has
developed that specifically examines the motivations for mergers16 The
motivations behind each merger are, of course, unique. But some mergers
may share certain motivations, and motivations may generally differ across
the three broad types of mergers: horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate.
Horizontal mergers involve a joining of firms that compete in the same
market; vertical mergers occur when a customer buys a supplier, or vice
versa; and conglomerate mergers join firms in different businesses. The
international nature of cross-border mergers adds another set of potential
motivations.
16 See, e.g., Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell & Erick Stafford, New Evidence and
Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (2001); Gregg Jarrell, James Brickley, & Jeffrey
Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49
(1988); Paul A. Pautler, Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions (Sept. 25, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, available from Bureau of Economics, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Working Paper No. 243),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp243.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2002). For a theoretical
treatment of market power and efficiency effects of horizontal mergers, see J. Farrell & C. Shapiro,
Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 107 (1990).
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One motivation for mergers is efficiency gains. Two firms may
consummate a merger because they expect that the assets of the two firms
can be used more efficiently in combination than separately. This might be
achieved if merging allows them to lower their costs, improve their
products, or expand their operations more effectively than they could as
separate entities.
In some cases, these efficiencies can be realized through cost savings
arising from the increased size of the merged entity, often referred to as
economies of scale or scope. This may result from consolidating and
spreading certain fixed overhead costs across the combined operations. For
instance, economies of scale appeared to be a factor motivating mergers
and acquisitions in the food retailing industry during the late 1990s. 7
When two supermarket chains merge, distribution centers made redundant
by the merger can be eliminated, and the costs of the remaining
distribution centers can be spread over a larger number of supermarkets.
In a horizontal merger, efficiencies might also come from combining
the best elements of each firm's operations. One motivation for vertical
mergers may be that certain transactions between a supplier and a
customer are particularly difficult to arrange between independent firms
and can be more efficiently arranged if both parties are part of the same
firm. Vertical mergers may also be an efficient method of removing
pricing distortions that arise when firms transact with one another in the
chain of production, each adding its margin along the way. Elimination of
these so-called double margins can lead to lower final product prices.
Reduction of agency costs, discussed above, can be another
significant source of efficiencies. If a corporation's executives are
unwilling to make or incapable of making decisions to increase
shareholders' profits, they may be replaced in a merger or acquisition. Or,
if the firm has assets that a new set of managers could put to higher value
use, the firm may be acquired, and new, better managers introduced.18 In
some cases, the existing management team may be underperforming
because the incentives it faces may be inadequate for it to act in the
shareholders' interest, or may even promote behavior that runs counter to
their interest. The acquisition or merger of such a firm provides a valuable
opportunity for new owners, not only to replace management, but also to
change the firm's governance structure in order to fix these inadequate or
perverse incentives.
17 See Phil Kaufman, Consolidation in Food Retailing: Prospects for Consumers and
Grocery Suppliers, USDA/ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK 18 (Aug. 2000).
18 Examining successful tender-offer takeovers between 1958 and 1984, Martin and
McConnell find that from the announcement of the takeover to one year after its completion, forty-two
percent of the target firms in these takeovers experience a change in the top manager. See Kenneth J.
Martin & John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management
Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671, 672 (1991).
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Although merger and acquisition activity may sometimes be a
response to agency problems, in some settings, it may actually be a
manifestation of such problems. Some acquisitions may be motivated by a
manager's ambition to increase the size of the firm under his or her
control, even though the acquisition is likely to reduce the shareholders'
profits. But research also suggests that such poor acquisitions can increase
the likelihood that the acquirer itself will become a target for acquisition.' 9
Cross-border mergers can enjoy efficiencies similar to those
described above, but the international nature of these transactions
introduces another set of potential efficiency gains as well. Just as the
opening of world markets to international trade raises productivity, so, too,
might a cross-border merger create benefits that no purely domestic
reorganization could achieve. These might result, for example, from
overcoming barriers to trade that hinder a firm from exporting to another
country, but not from acquiring production facilities and producing the
same goods there. Other efficiency gains from cross-border mergers might
come from gaining a better understanding of customers in a foreign
market, or from a company with good products acquiring a company with
good foreign distribution channels. Alternatively, efficiencies may arise
from differences in wages between countries that make it more profitable
for firms to locate their labor-intensive operations in countries with
abundant unskilled labor, while locating other operations, such as research
and management, in countries where skilled labor is relatively plentiful.
Of course, some of these gains may not require mergers and can be
realized simply by establishing new operations overseas. But in some
cases, merging with an established firm may be more efficient. Two
advantages that mergers can provide are quicker entry into new markets
and access to existing proprietary resources and capabilities, such as
established brands. A further benefit of a merger or joint venture is the
transfer of managerial or technological know-how across firm and national
boundaries. The transfer of innovative manufacturing systems may be best
achieved through some form of integration. This is discussed in greater
depth later in the Article in the context of the General Motors-Toyota joint
venture.
As described above, firms constantly look for potential efficiencies
from possible mergers in order to enhance their profitability in a
competitive market. Mergers with these motivations have the potential to
provide consumers with less expensive and better products or services. But
some mergers may reduce competition. This can happen if a merger of
competitors allows the merged firm or a collection of remaining firms to
19 See, e.g., Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?, 98
J. POL. ECON. 372 (1990).
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raise the prices of the goods or services they sell, or lower the prices they
pay for the goods or services they buy from suppliers. In the case of a
vertical merger, a firm may be able to reduce the competition it faces by
gaining control of either an important supplier to its industry or a
significant customer. As in virtually all transactions that come under
antitrust scrutiny, this potential to reduce competition may be either a
deliberate motivation for, or an inadvertent consequence of, the merger.
Higher prices to consumers as a result of reduced competition are due
to what economists call monopoly power, that is, the power of a single
seller to affect the market price. Lower prices to input suppliers as a result
of reduced competition are due to what economists call monopsony power,
that is, the power of a single buyer to affect the market price. Both effects
are exercises of market power, and thus a concern of competition policy.
Government has a role in preventing those mergers whose adverse effects
on competition exceed any benefit from accompanying efficiency gains.
The evolving way in which the federal government performs this role
through its competition policy will be described in more depth later in the
Article.
C. Other Organizational Forms: Joint Ventures and Partial Equity
Stakes
The various possible sources of increased efficiency from mergers,
including those that reduce agency costs, can also motivate other forms of
organizational change that do not involve complete transfer of both
ownership and control. The distribution of ownership and control across
parties to an organizational structure affects the parties' incentives and
opportunities, their ensuing decisions, and therefore the creation of social
value.
1. Joint Ventures
A joint venture is a business entity created and jointly controlled by
two or more separate firms, each of which makes a substantial contribution
to the enterprise. 2° Firms may seek to enter a joint venture for any of a
number of reasons. Joint ventures may allow firms to combine their
complementary skills or assets in a way that improves their ability to
accomplish a project. Such a venture may also allow the participants to
expand the scale of a project to a size necessary to realize certain cost
20 See Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1521
(1982).
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savings. By avoiding additional costs associated with a full merger, a joint
venture may best accomplish the firms' objectives.
One specific type of joint venture, the research joint venture, has its
own particular advantages. A joint venture to undertake scientific,
technical, or other research may appropriately reward innovation and
spread development costs in a setting where the resulting new knowledge,
if created by a single firm, would spill over to benefit others. Since, in that
case, no single firm would reap all the benefits of its research, a joint
venture may be the most efficient avenue for undertaking it.
But joint ventures might also raise concerns.21 For example, a
production joint venture between horizontal competitors might reduce their
ability or incentive to compete independently. Conceivably, the
participants could contribute all their manufacturing assets to the joint
venture, and their financial stakes in the joint venture could then lead to a
reduction in output by the two firms comparable to that in an
anticompetitive merger. Even if the joint venture participants retain
independent production assets, the joint venture may create the
environment for the exchange of competitively sensitive information on
prices and costs. This might facilitate an attempt by the firms to raise
prices in an anticompetitive manner.
2. Partial Equity Stakes
A merger or complete acquisition occurs when the ownership of the
assets of two firns is combined, for example, through one firm's
acquisition of one hundred percent of the shares of the other, or when two
firms exchange all of their shares for those of a new, successor
corporation. In contrast, a partial acquisition occurs when one firm takes a
partial equity stake in another firm, which remains legally independent.22
Partial equity acquisitions, like merger transactions, must be reported
to the Department of Justice and the FTC under the 1976 Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act if the transaction meets certain conditions.23 In fiscal year
2000, twenty-three percent of all transactions reported to the two agencies
resulted in the acquirer having less than a fifty percent share of the target
firm's equity. 24 Although these may be supplemented by later purchases,
the data suggest that partial purchases are not uncommon.
21 See Carl Shapiro & Robert D. Willig, On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint
Ventures, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 113 (1990).
22 See Daniel P. O'Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership:
Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559 (2000).
23 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000).
24 Memorandum from the Federal Trade Commission, to the Council of Economic Advisers
(November 15, 2001) (on file with the Council of Economic Advisers).
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Partial acquisitions create a form of corporate governance that raises
some basic questions about the "ownership" and "control" of one party
over another. Partial equity investments by one firm in another can grant
the investing firm substantial influence over the other firm. A majority
shareholder can be presumed to exercise control, although under some
constraints imposed by the duty toward minority shareholders.2 s But
research suggests that even ownership of far less than a majority of a
company's shares may allow the exercise of control, if the remaining
shares are widely dispersed.26
PepsiCo, Inc.'s investment in the Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc., is an
example of a partial equity stake that involves some control. The Pepsi
Bottling Group is the world's largest manufacturer, seller, and distributor
of Pepsi-Cola beverages.2 7 It has the exclusive right to manufacture, sell,
and distribute these beverages in much of the United States and Canada, as
well as in Spain, Greece, and Russia. PepsiCo holds the licenses for Pepsi-
Cola beverages and is a minority shareholder, albeit the largest one, in the
Pepsi Bottling Group.28 There is close coordination between the two
businesses, but each remains a legally independent entity whose interests
are not legally presumed to align with the other's.
At the other extreme, an individual who buys a few shares in a public
company may do so as an investment for retirement or for other purposes.
These small purchases best exemplify so-called passive investments, in
that the shareholder has no current plans to gain influence over the firm's
conduct or to access certain information about its operations, and there is
no good reason to expect such plans to emerge in the future. Likewise, one
firm may purchase a small equity stake in another firm without such plans
29or any realistic potential for such plans to emerge.
A partial acquisition can affect the firms' subsequent decisions
through three distinct channels: by altering incentives, altering
information, or altering control. 30 Through these channels, an acquisition
could have anticompetitive or pro-competitive effects. The potential
anticompetitive effects are considered first because, without those effects,
there is no concern for antitrust policy.
Even if a firm has only a passive investment in another firm, this
might, through altering incentives, affect the former's production and
25 O'Brien & Salop, supra note 22, at 57 1.
26 See, e.g., Jeffrey Zwiebel, Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control,
62 REV. ECON. STUD. 161 (1995).
27 See THE PEPSI BOTTLING GROUP INC., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, as filed in SEC FORM 10-
K (Mar. 28, 2001).
28 See PEPSICO, INC., SEC FORM I0-Q (May 2,2001).
29 See David Gilo, The Anticompetitive Effect of Passive Investment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1
(2000).
30 See id. for a discussion of the incentive and information effects.
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pricing decisions." For example, if firm A owns a five percent stake in
firm B, it will make production and pricing decisions to maximize its own
profits plus five percent of firm B's profits. The acquirer of a partial equity
stake will consequently internalize some of the spillover effects of its
actions on the target's profits. This is true whether or not the acquirer can
exercise control over the target.
Such a passive investment could have an anticompetitive effect in an
imperfectly competitive market if the two firms are direct competitors. If
firm A raises its price, for example, the five percent stake in firm B could
reduce the effect of any loss of customers on firm A's profits because some
of the lost customers would begin purchasing from firm B. Firm A would
capture part of firm B's increased profits, reducing its overall losses from
raising prices. This diminishes firm A's incentives to keep prices at a
competitive level. Nonetheless, this concern should not arise if other firms
in the market are able to expand their output and win most of the
customers that firm A loses when it raises its prices. Thus, competition
guards against the rise in prices.
The information effect arises from closer unilateral or bilateral
communication between the partial acquirer and the target about business
operations. 32 For example, if the partial acquirer receives a seat on the
target's board of directors, that may become an avenue for improved
communication between the firms. This improved communication could
facilitate anticompetitive conduct, for example, if two competitors
attempted to coordinate a rise in prices.
Finally, a partial acquirer may be able to influence the target's
business decisions through the control effect.33 This could have
anticompetitive consequences if the two firms are competitors. For
example, the acquirer might raise its price and exert its influence so that
the target responds by increasing its own price. But these effects can also
be prevented if other firms in the market expand their output in response to
higher prices.
Partial acquisitions may have socially desirable consequences,
operating through these same channels. In particular, partial equity stakes
may be undertaken as part of a larger business relationship, such as a
marketing or supply agreement. Such partial equity stakes may align
incentives, internalizing spillovers in ways that are socially beneficial.
31 See id.
32 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 21 (2000), for a discussion of sensitive information.
33 Id. at 20.
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These business relationships may also be cemented by the information and
control benefits facilitated by a partial equity stake.
34
One study examined 402 partial ownership stakes established
between 1980 and 1991 in which a nonfinancial corporation held a
minimum of five percent of the outstanding shares of another firm.
35
Thirty-seven percent of the target firms had explicit business relationships
with the corporation holding their shares.
More recent, although preliminary, data suggest that about five
percent of Fortune 500 nonfinancial companies in 2001 had a corporate
blockholder of five percent or more of their shares in that year. This
sample excludes companies in which there was a majority shareholder. In
this preliminary research, corporate blockholders appear to be more
prevalent in certain industries than others. In the rapidly evolving
telecommunications sector, for example, about a third of major U.S.
corporations had at least one corporate blockholder in 2001.
An example of how partial equity stakes may align the incentives
between parties in a business relationship is the 1997 co-production
agreement between Walt Disney Company and Pixar. At the time of their
co-production agreement, Disney acquired about a five percent stake in
Pixar.
36
3. Case Study: Pixar and Disney
Pixar was formed in 1986. Its first fully computer-animated feature
film, Toy Story, was released in 1995, also the year of the company's
initial public offering of shares. Toy Story was distributed by the Walt
Disney Company, under a contract in which Disney also bore all the
budgeted production costs. 37 In return, it received a standard distribution
fee from Pixar and the vast majority of the film's revenue, including about
ninety-five percent of box office receipts during the year after its release.
In 1997, Disney and Pixar entered into a co-production agreement to
produce and distribute five new computer-animated feature films. 38 Under
the agreement, Pixar would produce the films, on an exclusive basis, for
distribution by Disney. Disney and Pixar would split production costs and
all related receipts in excess of the amount necessary to cover Disney's
34 See Jeffrey W. Allen & Gordon M. Phillips, Corporate Equity Ownership, Strategic
Alliances, and Product Market Relationships, 60 J. FIN. 2791 (2000). For evidence from more recent
data, see CINDY R ALEXANDER, CORPORATE STOCK OWNERSHIP AS AN ALIGNMENT MECHANISM:
HIDDEN ACTIONS AND THE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE AND INSIDER OWNERSHIP (U.S. Dep't of
Justice Discussion Paper EAG 02-6, 2002).
35 Id.
36 PIXAR, SEC FORM 10-K (Apr. 30, 1997).
37 See id.
38 Id.
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distribution costs and an associated distribution fee. The films would also
be co-branded.
This agreement was cemented by Disney's acquisition of a partial
equity stake in Pixar. Disney initially acquired one million of Pixar's
shares and received warrants to purchase up to an additional 1.5 million
shares. At the time, exercising all these warrants would have given Disney
about a five percent stake in Pixar.
The Pixar-Disney co-production arrangement brought A Bug's Life to
the big screen in 1998, and Monsters, Inc. in 2001. The alliance benefits
both companies and exploits a logical division of labor between the firms.
As Pixar's 2000 10-K filing states, "This agreement allows [Pixar] to focus
on the production and creative development of the films while utilizing
Disney's marketing expertise and substantial distribution infrastructure to
market and distribute our co-branded feature films and related products."39
An interesting wrinkle is that Disney is not only a partner with Pixar,
but also a competitor. Pixar notes in its 2000 10-K filing that, under the
agreement, Disney directly shares in the profits from their co-branded
films, and therefore Pixar believes "that Disney desires such films to be
successful." But the filing also points out that, "Nonetheless, during its
long history, Disney has been a very successful producer and distributor of
its own animated feature films." Thus, although the profit-sharing terms of
the agreement give Disney powerful incentives to use its marketing and
distribution acumen to further the success of the co-branded films, the
partial equity stake plays a complementary role. Through this investment,
Disney shares directly in Pixar's success, and so has additional reasons to
foster the collaboration.
More generally, the potential for a partial equity stake to encourage
efficiency gains in the long-term relationship between a supplier and a
customer highlights an advantage of this form of organization. In a long-
term supply relationship, both customer and supplier may make
relationship-specific investments, such as fabricating machine tools to
produce a part according to the buyer's specifications. If the buyer's input
needs change unexpectedly, it may want rapid delivery of a modified input
from its supplier. If the supplier has an equity stake in the customer, and,
hence a claim to some of the customer's profits, the supplier may have a
stronger incentive to meet the customer's request, even if it must incur
overtime costs to adjust its machine tools. If the partial equity stake allows
one firm to exercise some control over the other firm, the coordination
between their operations is likely to be further strengthened.40
39 See PIXAR, SEC FORM 10-K (Apr. 30, 2001).
40 See Allen & Phillips, supra note 34.
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U. Incorporating Economic Insights into Competition Policy
Economists have long studied the implications of changes in the
structure and conduct of firms, creating a body of knowledge that
encompasses the insights described above. Developments in this body of
knowledge provide an important basis for improving the effectiveness of
competition policy.
A. The Evolution of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
The evolution of U.S. policy relating to horizontal mergers-those
between companies that compete for customers in the same market-
provides one example of how economic thought has substantially
enhanced competition policy in the past two decades. As explained above,
a merger between such companies can bring about benefits through
reductions in the cost and improvements in the quality of the merging
firms' products. But some such mergers have the potential to harm
competition. In determining whether to challenge a particular merger, the
Department of Justice or the FTC must assess whether the merger
threatens to harm competition and whether the potential benefits of
increased efficiencies outweigh any adverse effect the merger could have
on competition. To do so, the agencies have developed an analytical
framework that allows them to move from a set of observable
characteristics of the merging firms and the markets in which they
compete to an assessment of the likely competitive effect of the
transaction, balanced against any efficiency benefits.
This analytical framework is important in that it influences the types
of characteristics considered in evaluating mergers and related
acquisitions, whether the enforcement agencies challenge them, and how
they are ultimately viewed by the courts. This framework provides a focus
for arguments about the merits of or problems associated with a merger.
Finally, an analytical framework that is consistently followed increases
firms' ability to assess whether a merger they are considering will be
challenged, before they embark on the costly process of initiating it.
It is in contributing to the improvement of this analytical framework
that developments in economic thought have significantly affected merger
policy. This effect is visible in the evolution of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, a description of this framework that was first established by
the Department of Justice in 1968 and periodically revised since then by
both the Justice Department and the FTC.41 Although the need for
41 For an analysis of the evolution of treatment of vertical practices, see Sherry Glied &
Randall S. Kroszner, Much Ado About Nothing? Capital Market Reactions to Changes in Precedent
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flexibility in enforcing antitrust law causes these guidelines to be
somewhat general in nature, the trend towards an increasing incorporation
of a rigorous economic framework is nonetheless still apparent in the
periodic revisions to the guidelines. Because the ability to gain the
favorable ruling of a judge in an antitrust case affects these agencies'
ability to successfully challenge mergers, changes in the guidelines also, to
some extent, reflect accompanying changes in the judicial interpretation of
antitrust law.
Of the various revisions made during the past two decades, the 1982
Guidelines and the revisions made to them in 1984 together marked the
most dramatic departure from prior guidelines in their incorporation of
contemporary economic thought.42 One significant advance in these
revisions was a shift away from a singular focus on market concentration
in assessing the effect of a merger.43 Market concentration is a measure of
the extent to which the supply of products and services in a particular
market is concentrated among few providers. The earlier focus was
consistent with economic thinking, developed in the middle decades of the
twentieth century, according to which, increases in the concentration of
markets harmed competition. As a result, in the 1960s, mergers that raised
concentration by increasing a firm's market share to even as little as five
percent were at risk of being challenged.44
The 1982 Guidelines and 1984 Revisions reflected an evolving
economic perspective on the effect of concentration on competition in a
market. This perspective had increasingly gained judicial recognition by
the mid-1970s. 45 Theoretical and empirical work had begun to call into
question the idea that there is a simple link between a market's
concentration and the intensity of competition in that market. 6 By 1982,
judicial decisions and enforcement policies had already begun to
Concerning Exclusive Territories (Nov. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, available from University of
Chicago, Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, Working Paper No. 102).
42 The dramatic nature of the change embodied in the 1982 Guidelines, compared to later
revisions, was recognized in the release of the most recent revisions in 1997. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE &
FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 26 (1997). But, relative to actual
enforcement practices at the time, even the 1982 guidelines represented only an evolutionary change.
See Statement by Attorney General William French Smith Releasing the New Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines (June 14, 1982).
43 This shift is described in the press release accompanying the 1982 Department of Justice
Antitrust Merger Guidelines. A number of articles were published in the years after 1982 describing
the implications of the 1982 Guidelines. Two symposia on the 1982 guidelines are presented in A.B.A.
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, SYMPOSIUM ON ANTITRUST POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE
CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Eleanor Fox & James Halverson eds., 1984); and
Symposium, 1982 Merger Guidelines, 71 CAL. L. REV. 280 (1983).
44 See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 5.
45 Id.; see also Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164-84 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974).
46 See David Scheffman, Ten Years of Merger Guidelines: A Retrospective, Critique, and
Prediction, 8 REV. INDUS. ORG. 173 (1993).
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incorporate the conclusion from economic research that, although high
concentration could contribute to reduced competition, by itself it was not
sufficient to bring about that outcome.47 Thus, the 1982 Guidelines and
1984 Revisions codified the increasingly accepted view that examining
market concentration provides only a useful first step in considering
whether a merger raises competitive concerns, and that other factors
needed to be present to validate this concern. In line with this view, the
revisions described quantitative levels of market concentration and
changes therein that would likely cause the Justice Department and the
FTC to go on to examine the full set of factors and possibly challenge a
merger. The 1984 Guidelines also clearly established a level of market
concentration below which, "except in extraordinary circumstances,"
mergers would not be challenged. 48 This "safe harbor" level of market
concentration is important in that it reduces the uncertainty that firms
considering a merger may have about how the government will respond.
Such a clear safe harbor was absent in the 1968 guidelines.
One of the additional factors that the 1984 Revisions incorporated as
an important consideration in evaluating the intensity of competition in a
market was the ease with which new firms could enter that market.
Although existing firms in a market are the most visible source of
competition for each other, they are not the only source. In considering
whether it would be profitable to raise prices above existing levels, a firm
or group of firms must not only consider the response of firms already in
the market. It must also consider the possibility that higher prices will
encourage other firms to enter the market, adding to competition. Thus, in
some cases, even if there are few firms in a market today, the threat of new
firms entering tomorrow can provide a strong incentive for incumbent
firms to keep prices competitive. In an improvement on the earlier merger
guidelines, the 1980s guidelines recognized that a merger could only harm
competition if there were reasons to believe that other firms would not or
could not enter the market to the extent necessary to keep the merging
firms from maintaining prices above premerger levels.
Another substantial advance in the 1984 Guidelines, and improved
upon since then, was a greater recognition of potential efficiency gains
from mergers. Today, it is widely accepted among economists that mergers
should be evaluated in terms of a tradeoff between any potential adverse
impact on competition and their potential enhancement of competition by
47 This is recognized in the statement of the Attorney General with the release of the 1982
Guidelines.
48 The 1984 Revisions made this clarification to strengthen language in the 1982 Guidelines
which stated that challenges of mergers in industries below a particular concentration would be
"generally unlikely." See the press release accompanying the 1982 Merger Guidelines and the 1984
Guidelines as published in 13,103 TRADE REG. REP. 20,551(1984).
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improving the merging firms' operations. The 1968 guidelines had focused
attention almost exclusively on whether a merger could harm competition,
with little consideration given to the potential benefits, because these were
considered hard to evaluate and often realizable by other means.49 In
contrast, the 1984 guidelines recognized that mergers that might otherwise
be challenged may nonetheless be "reasonably necessary to achieve
significant net efficiencies."5 ° The guidelines set forth a number of types
of efficiency improvements that could be considered in assessing the
impact of a merger, such as economies of scale. Moreover, the tradeoff
often presented by mergers was explicitly recognized in the 1984
guidelines, which state that "a greater level of expected net efficiencies [is
needed] the more significant are the competitive risks identified."
Improvements in the consideration of these efficiencies, and in other
elements of the analytical framework applied to evaluating mergers,
continued in later revisions.
B. Competition Policy, Corporate Governance, and the Mergers of the
1980s and 1990s
In the years leading up to 1982, some elements of the new thinking
that would later appear in the revisions to the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines had already begun to be incorporated in the Justice
Department's and the FTC's enforcement practices, and in the
interpretation of antitrust laws by the courts. Nonetheless, the revisions
were important in codifying this dramatic adjustment in antitrust policy,
which allowed firms greater flexibility during the substantial restructuring
of the economy that occurred in the 1980s. In contrast, during the 1960s
and much of the 1970s, in line with the 1968 guidelines, federal policy and
judicial decisions relating to horizontal and vertical mergers had been quite
restrictive.
During the 1980s, the total value of merger activity picked up
considerably. In 1988, the total dollar value of mergers and acquisitions
was, in real terms, more than four times greater than it had been a decade
earlier. Two types of reorganization were prevalent during this period,
both of which might have faced greater opposition under the 1968
guidelines.5 ' The first involved the merging of two large firms in the same
industry, and the second involved the breakup of a conglomerate, in which
individual business lines were often sold to firms competing in the same
49 See Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice, 4510 TRADE REG. REP. 6881
(1968).
50 See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 48.
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market as the business line they were acquiring. Although such mergers
and acquisitions might still be opposed under the revised guidelines if they
presented significant concerns about the effects on competition, the
improved economic understanding of competition in markets reflected in
the revisions caused antitrust enforcement policy to be less restrictive
toward such mergers. The increasing frequency of mergers involving two
firms in the same industry continued in the 1990s.
5 2
In the 1980s and 1990s, mergers were clustered in particular
industries, although the industries in which they were clustered varied over
time. 3 This suggests that mergers may have provided an important means
for companies to respond to industry-wide shocks such as deregulation,
technological innovations, or supply shocks. Between 1988 and 1997, on
average, nearly half of annual merger deal volume was in industries
adjusting to changing conditions brought about by deregulation. 4 One
study bf Massachusetts hospitals shows the effect of technological
innovation on merger activity.55 The study found that new drug therapies
and improvements in medical procedures were partly responsible for a
significant decline in the number of in-patient days from the early 1980s to
the mid-1990s. This reduction in the need for hospital beds contributed to
a significant consolidation among hospitals during this period, much of
which was facilitated by mergers.
Evidence of stock market reactions to merger announcements during
the 1980s and 1990s suggests that, on the whole, they created value for the
shareholders of the combined firms.5 6 Moreover, studies have found that,
in the aggregate, the operating performance of merging firms has
improved following the merger. But these aggregate results present
evidence of only modest gains, the source of which is unclear.
Yet, this is to be expected, because mergers have numerous
motivations, and, as with all business decisions in a competitive market,
not all will yield the success that is hoped for. As a result, more narrow
studies of particular industries, particular types of mergers, and even
specific mergers can yield a richer understanding of the sources and extent
of gains. For instance, detailed examinations of bank mergers during the
1990s found cases of postmerger performance improvements that likely
came from a variety of sources, including opportunities afforded by the
52 See Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, supra note 16.
53 See Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, supra note 16; Mark Mitchell & Harold Mulherin, The
Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 193 (1996).
54 Mitchell & Mulherin, supra note 53.
55 See Jason Barro & David Cutler, Consolidation in the Medical Care Marketplace: A
Case Study from Massachusetts, in MERGERS AND PRODUCTIVITY 16 (Steven Kaplan ed., 2000).
56 Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford provide one of the most recent summaries of the
literature examining the impacts of mergers on share prices of merging companies, and on their
operating performance. Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford, supra note 16, at 116-18.
Yale Journal on Regulation
merger to expand service offerings and the efforts of a vigorous
management team acquiring a laggard bank.57 Perhaps indicative of larger
trends, however, along with uncovering successes, these examinations also
revealed some bank mergers with disappointing results.
The important point for competition policy is that, although the
overall efficiency consequences of the mergers of the 1980s and 1990s
may be debated, there is little evidence that they harmed competition. Thus
it appears that thoughtful and adaptive antitrust policy has afforded
businesses greater flexibility to respond to changing economic conditions
while preventing such responses from significantly harming competition.
The agencies' improved understanding of the sources of possible
competitive harm also helped firms structure or restructure their proposed
transactions so as to achieve the efficiencies they sought without raising
competitive concerns. For example, a 1998 transaction sought to combine
two of the nation's largest grain distribution and trading businesses.5 8 The
combination had the potential to lower operating and capital costs but
might also have depressed the prices farmers received in certain locations
for their grain. The parties agreed to divest certain facilities at certain
locations, settling the Department of Justice's challenge to the transaction
and allowing the acquisition to proceed. Cases such as this one can be seen
as a manifestation of an increasingly thoughtful and adaptive competition
policy.
C. The Role of Corporate Governance Changes
For many of the mergers and takeovers of the 1980s that appeared to
create social value, changes in corporate governance and ensuing
reductions in agency costs often played an important role. In some cases,
takeovers led to the breakup of large conglomerates, forcing apart business
units that were presumably more valuable on their own or in other
companies' hands. Many incumbent managers resisted these restructurings
until forced to accept them through the market for corporate control, as
takeovers or the threat thereof often led to changes in the organization of
firms.
Although many types of mergers and acquisitions may have led to
changes in corporate governance, some of the most dramatic changes
therein came about as a result of leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Moreover,
evidence suggests that LBOs during the 1980s led to significant
57 Charles Calomiris & Jason Karceski, Is the Bank Merger Wave of the 1990s Efficient?
Lessons from Nine Case Studies, in Kaplan, supra note 55, at 93.
58 See United States v. Cargill, Inc., No. 1: 99CV01875 (D.D.C. filed Jul. 8, 1999);
Cargill's Acquisition of Continental Grain: Anatomy of a Merger, AGRIC. OUTLOOK (Economic
Research Service/USDA), Sept. 1999, at 21-24.
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improvements in the productivity of firms.59 In an LBO or a management
buyout, corporations become closely held companies as their public stock
is bought by a group of investors using borrowed money. Consequently,
ownership becomes much more concentrated and more tightly connected
to control. This new ownership and capital structure creates significantly
greater incentives for managers to increase profits as much as possible.
One study showed that CEOs of firms involved in LBOs during the 1980s
saw their ownership stake rise by more than a factor of four, thereby
making them more interested in increasing the firm's profits. 60 Moreover,
the need to service debt issued to finance the buyout provided a
disciplining force on management.
Taken together, these incentives likely influenced decisions by some
firms to sell off assets that had higher value outside the firm than inside
it.61 Many LBOs did not raise antitrust issues because the initial
transaction simply involved changing the ownership of an existing firm,
rather than a combination with a competitor. However, some business unit
sell-offs following certain LBOs were to firms in the unit's industry.62
Therefore, where these sell-offs could improve the performance of the
firms without affecting competition, the increased flexibility afforded by
adjustments to antitrust policy may have been important.
Once the firm's operations were restructured and a new governance
structure was put in place, many LBO firms were successfully taken public
again. 6' Although LBO activity dwindled in the 1990s, the expansion of
pay for performance suggests that mechanisms to align managerial with
shareholder interests remain an important, enduring element of corporate
governance.64
The restructurings of the 1980s provide an example of the importance
of adapting competition policy to a growing understanding of the
conditions within industries that may harm or benefit consumers. The
ongoing incorporation of these insights into the analytical framework used
to guide competition policy has strengthened the effectiveness of antitrust
enforcement, while reducing the likelihood that antitrust enforcement will
hinder reorganizations whose economic benefits to society would
outweigh any potential harm from reduced competition.
59 See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in
the US.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 127 (2001).
60 See Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and
Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217 (1989).
61 See Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s:
The Return to Corporate Specialization, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS,
SPECIAL ISSUE (1990).
62 Id. at 40.
63 See Steven Kaplan, The Staying Power of Leveraged Buyouts, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 287
(1991).
64 See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 59.
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III. Policy Lessons for Promoting Organizational Efficiencies
As noted earlier, organizational change in today's economy takes
place not only through mergers but also through other organizational forms
such as joint ventures and partial acquisitions. The challenge for antitrust
scholarship and public policy is to provide an integrated framework for all
these organizational innovations that properly accounts for both
competitive and efficiency effects. These types of transactions evoke
intertwined issues in corporate governance and competition policy, and so
an integrated framework supports sound policymaking. For example, how
a given partial equity acquisition is likely to affect the acquirer's
relationship with the target depends on more than just the size of the
partial equity interest acquired and the nature of any accompanying
shareholder agreement, which may, for example, confer the right to
appoint representatives to the firm's board of directors. It also depends on
the acquirer's current and likely future plans, and those of other
blockholders and the firm's incumbent managers. Even ascertaining that
the acquirer will gain control need not imply that the transaction would be
anticompetitive; as in merger policy, that depends upon the market
environment and on the efficiencies that the transaction would create.
A. Policy Lessons from Joint Ventures
Joint ventures can lower the costs of producing goods and services
and widen consumer choice. But partners in a joint venture may also be
actual or potential competitors in the product market. In 1983, for
example, General Motors (GM) Corp. and Toyota Motor Corp. agreed to
establish a joint venture to produce a subcompact car at a former GM plant
in Fremont, California. This venture was later formalized as New United
Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMII). 65 Both partners expected to benefit
from the undertaking: GM, by adding to its capabilities in producing
smaller cars, and Toyota, by gaining the opportunity to test its production
methods in an American environment. It was an unprecedented initiative
and generated an extensive, fifteen-month FTC investigation, which
resulted in its approval.66
A new organizational innovation, by definition, will not have an
established track record for an antitrust agency to review. But such an
organization may create genuine, important efficiencies even if those
65 A history of NUMMI is available at http://www.nummi.com/timeline.html (last visited
Jan. 1,2002).
66 The final FTC decision and the commissioners' statements accompanying that decision
can be found at General Motors and Toyota Motor Corp., 48 Fed. Reg. 57,246 (Dec. 28, 1983), and
General Motors and Toyota Motor Corp.; Correction, 48 Fed. Reg. 57,314 (Dec. 29, 1983).
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efficiencies are difficult to document at the time of the transaction. For
example, a key issue before the FTC was whether the joint venture would
enable Toyota to learn how its "lean" production and assembly system
would function in an American factory, and enable GM to learn details of
the Toyota system that could be applied to raise productivity at its other
plants.
If Toyota's manufacturing success was completely embodied in a
superior piece of equipment, then merely licensing that equipment to U.S.
automakers might have been sufficient to transfer that success to American
soil. That type of efficiency gain also would have been relatively easy to
document contemporaneously. Yet, as subsequent scholarship has
confirmed, Toyota's lean production system is an interrelated set of
practices, affecting factory and job design, labor-management relations,
relationships with suppliers, and management of inventories.6 7 As the FTC
majority opinion concluded, "in depth, daily accumulation of knowledge
regarding seemingly minor details is a more important source for increased
efficiency than a broad but shallow understanding of Japanese methods.
Such in depth knowledge appears to be achieved only through the kind of
close relationship the [joint] venture will allow.,
68
Experience shows that the joint venture did lead to productivity
improvements. One study indicated that, within a few years, each
automobile produced at the NUMMI plant required 19 assembly hours of
labor, versus 31 hours at one of GM's mass production plants in the United
States, and 16 hours at one of Toyota's plants in Japan. 69 The productivity
of the NUMMI plant was close to that of Toyota's Japanese plant even
though NUMMI workers were relatively early in the learning process
about lean production, suggesting that this system could indeed be
transplanted successfully. Several other welcome developments followed
in the wake of the joint venture's early success. Toyota expanded its own
production and assembly plant operations in the United States. GM and
other U.S. automakers adopted elements of lean production, improving
their productivity. 0 And NUMMI expanded. By 1997, the joint venture
67 Langefeld and Scheffman discuss Lieberman's distinction between discrete innovations
that might be embodied in licensed equipment, and transferring of manufacturing system innovations,
which may require a joint venture or merger to achieve such a transfer of innovation. They then
describe how the latter type of innovations more aptly describe those transferred through the NUMMI
joint-venture. See James Langenfeld & David Scheffman, Innovation and U.S. Competition Policy, 34
ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1989); Marvin Lieberman, Learning by Doing and Dynamic Industrial
Competitiveness, in INSEAD RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL MANUFACTURING
15(1987).
68 Supra note 66.
69 See JAMES WOMACK, DANIEL JONES & DANIEL ROOS, THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED
THE WORLD 82 (1991).
70 See Charles Fine et al., Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Industry Faces the 21 st Century: The
U.S. Automobile Manufacturing Industry, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technology
Policy (1996).
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had produced its three-millionth vehicle, and, in 2001, the Fremont facility
was producing three vehicle models.7
The broader policy lesson is that joint ventures and other
organizational hybrids may create efficiencies in ways that are difficult to
prove at the time of the transaction. In evaluating transactions that might
also raise anticompetitive concerns, antitrust authorities face the uncertain
prospect of improved efficiency as a factor in evaluating the joint
venture's likely effect. A new, potentially efficiency-enhancing
organization can benefit society in two ways. First, society gains direct
benefits from the organization. Second, society also receives the
demonstration of the types of efficiencies that such an organization could
create. This provides evidence to other firms, and to antitrust enforcement
agencies, of the private and social gains of such organizations. If the new
organization proves efficient, other firms may adopt that form. If it does
not prove efficient, market forces will motivate the firms to abandon it. In
either case, the antitrust agencies will have a broader track record to rely
upon. when evaluating similar transactions that might raise competitive
questions.
The guidelines describing how U.S. enforcement agencies assess
mergers or collaborations such as joint ventures indicate that efficiencies
arising from them will be considered if they are verifiable and cannot be
practically achieved through other means, making them transaction-
specific. 72 "Verifiable" here means that the parties must substantiate
efficiency claims so that the agencies can verify, by reasonable means,
their likelihood and magnitude.73 In these guidelines, certain efficiency
claims are viewed as less likely to meet these criteria than are others. For
instance, the agencies view improvements attributed to management as
less likely to meet the criteria necessary for consideration.74 But efficiency
gains from mergers or joint ventures may be closely tied with managerial
improvements, such as combining Toyota management with unionized
American workers in NUMMI.7 Managerial and organizational
improvements may indeed be difficult to verify, but, given their potential
social value, expending the resources necessary to investigate those claims
thoroughly is justified. This policy lesson applies to mergers as well as
j oint ventures.
Legislation indeed exists to encourage efficient joint ventures. In
1984, the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) became law, to be
71 See discussion of NUMMI at http://www.nummi.com/timeline.html and
http://www.nummi.com/facts.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2002).
72 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, § 4.
73 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 32, at 23-24.
74 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 32, at 30-32.
75 See Langefeld & Scheffman, supra note 64.
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followed nine years later by the National Cooperative Research and
Production Act.76 These two acts encourage research and production joint
ventures by codifying antitrust treatment of such ventures. 7 They lowered
the maximum penalty that could be assessed in a successful private
antitrust lawsuit against any venture that had notified the Justice
Department at the time of its formation. 78 For all joint ventures, the act
also ensured that, in any antitrust challenge, the courts would consider
efficiencies arising from the joint venture. 79 This clarified that defendants
could exonerate themselves by establishing the benefits of their joint
ventures. Since the passage of the NCRA, more than nine hundred
research or production ventures have registered with the Justice
Department. 80
Successful research joint ventures may foster innovation and thus
bring benefits to society. This and other ways in which economic
organization and competition policy promote innovation are elaborated in
Part V, on dynamic competition, later in this Article.
B. Shaping Policies to Address Partial Equity Stakes
As we have seen, firms make partial equity investments under a
variety of conditions to achieve a variety of ends. The overall effect can be
to promote efficiency or reduce competition, depending on the nature of
the acquisition and the conditions under which it is made. Partial
acquisitions most dramatically confer control or influence over the target
company when a majority of its outstanding equity is acquired. Acquirers
obtain substantial influence in some instances with much smaller stakes,
however. Partial acquisitions also give the acquirer a stake in the target
firm's future profits. This gives the acquirer an incentive to take those
profits into account when making its own business decisions. Finally, a
partial acquisition can make it easier for the acquirer to obtain access to
the management of the target firm. All these elements can have substantial
effects on the relationship between the target and the acquiring firm.
Because strong product market competition can depend on the
independence of firm actions, all of these aspects of partial acquisitions
can raise serious antitrust enforcement concerns. The challenge in shaping
76 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306 (2000).
77 See NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS, 2-39
(2000).
78 See Julie DeCourcy, Research Joint Ventures and International Competitiveness:
Evidence from the National Cooperative Research Act (Apr., 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Yale Journal on Regulation.).
79 See 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (2000).
80 Memorandum from the U.S. Department of Justice, to the Council of Economic Advisers
(Jan. 8, 2002) (on file with the Council of Economic Advisers).
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policies to address partial equity ownership by corporations lies in
distinguishing cases that pose serious threats to product market
competition from those that promote efficient cooperation between
suppliers. Although some of these issues are fairly new, the challenge is
similar to that posed by the analysis of mergers and, of course, joint
ventures.
With the emergence of partial acquisitions among major U.S.
corporations, the Justice Department and the FTC have created an
enforcement record that publicly illustrates some of the concerns these
acquisitions can raise. For example, Primestar was formed in 1990 as a
joint venture involving five of the nation's largest cable television
providers and a satellite provider." In 1997, Primestar announced its
intention to acquire satellite assets from two other companies. These assets
could be used for direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") service, which
transmits video programming directly from satellites to subscribers' homes
and competes for customers with cable television. The cable companies
involved in the original joint venture would have maintained a substantial
ownership and control stake in the entity resulting from the proposed
acquisition. Since the assets in question were the last available that other
independent providers of DBS could use or expand into, Primestar's
ownership structure raised concerns at the Justice Department during its
review of the acquisition. Concerned that the cable companies would exert
their influence in Primestar to limit how the acquired assets would be used
in competing with cable, the Justice Department challenged the
acquisition, which was subsequently abandoned. 2 The determination that
this acquisition would have caused competitive harm hinged upon an
assessment of how the new entity's governance structure would affect its
behavior.
1. Case Study: The Primestar Acquisition
A basic assumption in assessing the competitive implications of a
merger is that the merged firms will act in such a way as to maximize the
new entity's profits. A firm's owners, however, may also have other
objectives. Usually these other objectives are not significant enough to
alter the basic assumption. But when a firm's owners clearly have other
interests, such as financial stakes in other ventures, these could influence
their decisions regarding the firm's actions. In such cases, those assessing
a merger must consider how strong those influences might be on an owner
81 See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Primestar Acquisition of the News Corp./MCI Direct
Broadcast Satellite Assets, 16 REv. INDUS. ORG. 193 (2000).
82 See United States v. Primestar, Inc., No. 1: 98CV01 193 (JLG) (D.D.C. May 12, 1998).
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and that owner's ability to affect firm decisions in ways that may harm
competition.
Primestar was formed in 1990 as a joint venture involving five of the
largest cable television providers and a satellite provider. Given that the
five cable providers would control almost ninety-eight percent of the
voting shares in Primestar after the proposed acquisition, there were
concerns about how this would affect its use of the acquired assets. If
Primestar used these new assets to compete vigorously with cable for
subscribers in order to maximize its profits, under certain assumptions, the
effect of lost customers on the profits of some owners' cable businesses
might outweigh their share of the gains from Primestar improving its
subscriber base.83 As a result, one might suspect that these owners would
seek to influence Primestar's actions to reduce its competition with cable.
On the other hand, Primestar's managers and board of directors would
have had legal obligations to serve the interests of minority shareholders
that would benefit financially from Primestar competing vigorously with
cable television, and the board included independent outside directors.?
Moreover, it appeared that not all the cable providers would have had an
incentive to prevent such competition. Thus, the composition of
Primestar's ownership and governance structure suggested that there might
be opposing forces that would seek different outcomes of decisions
affecting competition in the consumer market that DBS serves.
The Justice Department analyzed the totality of incentive and
governance effects in this case and concluded, on balance, that the
transaction would harm competition and consumers. It filed suit to block
the acquisition, leading to its abandonment. This case demonstrates that an
assessment of a merger or acquisition's competitive implications can
require an understanding of how the governance structure of a company
allows those with a share in its control, or a financial stake in its
operations, to influence decisions affecting the firm's actions.
2. Policy Tools
As the Primestar case illustrates, the government's evaluation of how
partial acquisitions are likely to affect competition requires the
examination of conditions under which the parties to the transaction
compete, as would be the case in the evaluation of a full merger. Only to
the extent that competition between cable and DBS benefits consumers, or
society generally, would the Primestar acquisition have been likely to have
a serious adverse effect on competition. The partial nature of the cable
83 See Rubinfeld, supra note 81.
84 See O'BRIEN & SALOP, supra note 22, at 559.
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companies' stake in Primestar thus raised questions in addition to, rather
than apart from, those that arise in the traditional evaluation of mergers.
Also, as in the evaluation of mergers and joint ventures, the Justice
Department and the FTC typically consider the evidence on whether each
partial acquisition may promote efficiency.
Some of the tools that economists use to analyze efficiency gains
derived from vertical relationships generally may prove useful in the
analysis of partial acquisitions between suppliers of complementary
products. For example, the influence or control that the acquirer may
exercise over the target raises the acquirer's incentive to make certain
relationship-specific investments. Relationship-specific investments are
those that, once made, are much more valuable inside a particular business
relationship than outside it, such as fabrication equipment that is
specialized to a particular customer's design. The acquirer's control rights
make it less likely that the target will later "hold up" the acquirer, and
deprive it of its appropriate return on its investment. These control rights
are important because it is costly to go to court to try to enforce a written
agreement. If one party effectively controls the other party, disputes over
the business arrangement may be resolved at lower cost internally.85
Although the costs of dispute resolution may be lowered through a partial
or complete equity interest of one party in the other, there are other costs
to this integration, such as "influence costs" as agents seek to lobby
decisionmakers within the organization. But market forces will lead firms
to choose the arrangement that minimizes their total costs.
8 6
Another example derives from the lesson from scholarship that, if one
firm acquires another outright, the acquirer's specific investment
incentives are strengthened, but the target's specific investment incentives
are weakened. 87 In the context of a corporate acquisition, this means that
stakeholders in the target company care much less how that company's
85 See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: A STUDY IN THE
ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION (1975); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen
Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 297 (1978); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver E. Williamson,
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 232 (1979).
86 See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the
Organization of Economic Activity, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 57 (James E.
Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1994).
87 A description of the incentives that result from such an acquisition is provided in JAMES
A. BRICKLEY ET AL., MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 460-92 (2d
ed. 2001). An analysis of a contractual arrangement in which bilateral investment incentives were
important is provided by Joseph C. Mullin & Wallace P. Mullin, United States Steel's Acquisition of
the Great Northern Ore Properties: Vertical Foreclosure or Efficient Contractual Governance?, 13 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 74 (1997); see also Timothy J. Muris, David T. Sheffman & Pablo T. Spiller,
Strategy and Transaction Costs: The Organization of Distribution in the Carbonated Soft Drink
Industry, 1 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 83 (1992).
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assets are deployed after selling their stakes. Therefore, if a project can
best succeed through such investment by both parties, an optimal
ownership arrangement may be one in which one party holds a partial
equity stake in, rather than completely owning, the other. This raises the
investment incentives of the partial owner while not unduly undermining
those of the target.
An important challenge in the development of competition policy
toward these new corporate governance practices will be to make effective
use of these tools in light of the evidence that has emerged on the antitrust
concerns that those practices can raise, and the beneficial effects that can
result from them. Some progress will arise through the identification of
factors that enforcement authorities will increasingly consider in
evaluating partial acquisitions, and that parties will increasingly consider
when deciding whether to propose them. Other progress will emerge from
a clearer understanding of how these practices affect product markets and
economic efficiency more generally. With a clearer sense of the general
consequences of these transactions, and of the specific factors that can lead
those consequences to vary from case to case, we can expect further
advances in the development of tools to evaluate these new governance
practices.
C. Policy Toward Vertical Relations
Some tools for the analysis of these governance practices may derive
from a well-developed economics literature on vertical relations between
independent firms, a subject in which important issues in firm organization
and competition policy arise. Firm activities and market transactions often
involve a vertical production and distribution chain, such as a relationship
between a manufacturer (called, in this situation, the upstream firm) and a
distributor (the downstream firm)."8
Antitrust law and its enforcement have a long history of influence
over these organizational decisions, such as whether a firm owns the retail
outlets for its goods or services. For example, the owner of a business
format and brand name for a fast-food restaurant concept may also own
individual restaurants, or it may enter into a franchise agreement. A
franchise agreement is one between two legally independent firms, the
franchisor (the owner of the business format) and the franchisee (in this
example, the owner of the individual restaurant). The agreement might
specify that the franchisee may operate a restaurant at the given location
88 See BRICKLEY ET AL., supra note 87, at 462.
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according to the specified format, in exchange for a franchising fee and a
royalty rate on the restaurant's sales.8 9
This organizational choice is, in part, a response to various agency
costs. In particular, since a franchisee owns the individual restaurant, he or
she has incentives to exert certain types of effort to build up the value of
that store. Under company ownership, the manager of the restaurant is an
employee and, even if paid a bonus wage based on sales, does not have as
strong an incentive as a storeowner to invest effort to raise the value of that
store.90 But franchising may exacerbate other agency costs. For example,
the owner-operator of the only restaurant on a busy interstate highway may
expect to have many one-time customers, and therefore might charge
prices that are too high-a decision that may be profitable for that owner
but tarnishes the brand name and lowers its nationwide value.91 In a
company-owned restaurant, the manager has less incentive or ability to act
in this manner. The fact that both franchise stores and company-owned
stores successfully coexist in our economy reflects differences in agency
costs in various industries and settings.92
These organizational choices can also be influenced by competition
policy, which affects the costs of various possible terms of an agreement
between independent upstream and downstream firms, such as a franchise
agreement. For example, the upstream firm might wish to specify a
maximum retail or "resale" price, which would prevent an individual store
from taking advantage of its local market position and potentially harming
the reputation of the brand name. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in
State Oil v. Khan, there are pro-competitive rationales for such vertical
restraints, which is why such a pricing provision is now evaluated for its
competitive consequences on a case-by-case basis.93 Before the Supreme
Court's decision, however, an attempt to set a maximum resale price in an
agreement between legally independent upstream and downstream firms
would have been illegal per se. As a result, owners of a business format
who were concerned about the possibility of franchisees pricing too high
may have instead chosen to own those restaurants or stores outright. 94 That
choice would have addressed the pricing issue but increased other agency
costs related to effort by restaurant managers. This example shows one
89 Id. at 482, 598.
90 See FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, PRICING DECISIONS IN FRANCHISED CHAINS: A LOOK AT
THE RESTAURANT AND FAST-FOOD INDUSTRY (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
5247, 1995).
91 See BRICKLEY ET AL., supra note 87, at 470.
92 See FRANCINE LAFONTAINE & KATHRYN L. SHAW, TARGETING MANAGERIAL CONTROL:
EVIDENCE FROM FRANCHISING (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8416, 2001); see
also BRICKLEY ET AL., supra note 87, at 484.
93 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
94 See LAFONTAINE, supra note 90, at 22, 27.
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way in which competition policy with regard to vertical restraints
nowadays takes into account the social benefits that may be created by
having transactions organized between two separate firms rather than
through common ownership or vertical integration.
IV. Cross-Border Organizational Changes
Competition policy continues to respond to other changes in the
organization of economic activity. The GM-Toyota joint venture, for
example, presaged something that has become much more prominent since
the venture's establishment: changes in firm organization, including
mergers, that occur across national boundaries. This Part describes some of
the challenges that the international nature of these changes presents for
antitrust policy and how the United States is responding.
A. Multijurisdictional Review
Merger proposals involving or creating multinational enterprises can
result in reviews by the antitrust authorities of many nations, often referred
to as multijurisdictional review. The United States has managed the issues
posed by multijurisdictional review through both bilateral cooperative
relationships and multilateral arrangements. 95 This has produced an
impressive degree of analytical convergence among the U.S. and other
antitrust agencies, resulting in a long line of compatible decisions in
transnational mergers. 96 However, some differences remain, and these can
have significant consequences. A striking recent example came with the
proposed acquisition by General Electric Company ("GE") of Honeywell
International Inc. Both GE and Honeywell are U.S.-headquartered
corporations, but because these multinational enterprises also have
significant European sales, the deal was subject to review by antitrust
authorities of the European Union.97
GE and Honeywell agreed on their merger in October 2000. Although
each operates in a number of product lines, a key focus of the case was the
complementary goods they produce for the commercial aviation industry.
GE is one of three independent global manufacturers of large commercial
aircraft engines, and Honeywell makes a number of systems essential for
95 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FINAL REPORT (2000).
96 See id.
97 See Decision of the European Commission in Case COMP/M.2220-General
Electric/Honeywell (July 3, 2001), 2001 O.J. (C 74) 6; see also European Commission press releases
and other materials surrounding the decision, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/
merger/cases/index/bynr m_44.html#M_2220 (last visted May 5, 2002).
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aircraft operation, ranging from landing gear to communications and
navigation systems.98
After agreeing to some changes to their transaction, including the
divestiture of Honeywell's helicopter engine division, the parties received
conditional clearance from the Justice Department in May 2001 to proceed
with their merger.99 But the merger could not be consummated until it
received clearance from the European Commission and other authorities.
The Commission sought additional changes and conditions that were
unacceptable to the parties. In July 2001, the Commission rejected the
deal, and so the proposed merger did not take place. 00 The Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust issued this statement after that decision:
Having conducted an extensive investigation of the GE/Honeywell
acquisition, the Antitrust Division reached a firm conclusion that the
merger, as modified by the remedies we insisted upon, would have been
procompetitive and beneficial to consumers. Our conclusion was based
on findings, confirmed by customers worldwide, that the combined firm
could offer better products and services at more attractive prices than
either firm could offer individually. That, in our view, is the essence of
competition.
The EU, however, apparently concluded that a more diversified,
and thus more competitive, GE could somehow disadvantage other
market participants. Consequently, we appear to have reached different
results from similar assessments of competitive conditions in the affected
markets.
Clear and longstanding U.S. antitrust policy holds that the antitrust
laws protect competition, not competitors. Today's EU decision reflects a
significant point of divergence. For years, U.S. and EU competition
authorities have enjoyed close and cooperative relations. In fact, there
were extensive consultations in this matter throughout the entire process.
This matter points to the continuing need for consultation to move
toward greater policy convergence.tot
98 See Press Release, General Electric Company, Statement by General Electric Regarding
European Commission Decision (July 3, 2001) (on file with the Council of Economic Advisers); Press
Release, Honeywell International Inc., The Commission Prohibits GE's acquisition of Honeywell (July
3, 2001) (on file with the Council of Economic Advisers).
99 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in
Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001) (on file with the Council of Economic
Advisers).
100 See sources cited supra, note 98.
101 Statement by Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James on the EU's Decision
Regarding the GE/Honeywell Acquisition, U.S. Dep't of Justice (July 3, 2001).
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The European Union's objection to the merger centered around
advantages that the combination would yield for the merged firm over its
competitors in the markets for aircraft engines, avionics, and other aircraft
systems. 102 The Commission found that, among other factors, GE's
vertical integration into aircraft leasing through its GECAS subsidiary,
along with GE's deep financial resources, would lead inexorably to the
merged firm's dominance in markets for certain aircraft systems.'0 3 In
addition, the Commission found that the merger would give the combined
GE-Honeywell the ability and the incentive to offer complementary
products on more attractive terms than could competitors with narrower
product lines.'0 4 This last category of objections has been termed "range"
or "portfolio" effects. 0 5
The Commission found that these mechanisms would have the effect
of driving the premerger competitors of both GE and Honeywell out of
effective participation in their respective markets, presumably leading to
higher prices in the long run as the merged firm became unconstrained by
competitive pressures.10 6 U.S. antitrust authorities, in contrast, found that
most of the alleged harms under the Commission's theory flowed from
what are normally considered benefits of a merger-efficiencies that lead
to lower prices.'0 7 They found little evidence that competitors would be
unable to respond to any lower prices generated by the merger and thus be
driven from the market. Finding more efficient combinations of productive
resources that lead to lower costs and lower prices is, as the Assistant
Attorney General said, the essence of competition. Blocking mergers that
generate such efficiencies risks serious economic harm to consumers and
to markets generally.
B. Elements of International Policy Convergence
Halting efficient multinational mergers destroys value precisely
because an integrated multinational firm can create specific efficiencies.
As noted earlier, these may include exploiting economies of scale and
scope, and combining central managerial guidance and appropriate pay for
performance with the local knowledge of managers in various overseas
markets. The European Commission might have been more likely to clear
102 Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, The Commission Prohibits GE's Acquisition of Honeywell
(July 3, 2001) (on file with the Council of Economic Advisers); see also sources cited supra, note 97.
103 See Decision of the European Commission in Case, supra note 97.
104 Id.
105 Antitrust Division Submission for OECD Roundtable on Portfolio Effects in
Conglomerate Mergers, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Range Effects: The United States Perspective (Oct. 19,
2001) (on file with the Council of Econmic Advisers) [hereinafter OECD Submission].
106 See Decision of the European Commission in Case, supra note 97.
107 OECD Submission, supra note 105, at 20-23.
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the GE-Honeywell merger if GE had agreed to divest its aircraft leasing
subsidiary GECAS. But such a divestiture might have sacrificed
efficiencies.
As the GE-Honeywell example indicates, there are some important
differences in competition policy between the United States and other
nations. But cases that produce such conflicting results have been rare and
are likely to remain the exception. 1 8 Moreover, steps toward appropriate
convergence have already taken place, and this Administration is
committed to seeking further convergence to promote the spread of sound
antitrust policy. The United States should not seek convergence for its own
sake, of course, but, rather, in order to establish certain core principles of
sound competition policy across all jurisdictions.
C. Core Principles of Competition Policy
Competition policy should operate according to explicit guidelines
based on clear economic principles. Economic analysis should be central
because competition policy shapes fundamental economic decisions, such
as production, pricing, and the organization of firms. These guidelines
should reduce uncertainty by providing an indication to firms as to what
kinds of conduct and transactions may bring scrutiny from competition
authorities.
Competition policy should be concerned with protecting competition,
not competitors, as a means of promoting efficient resource allocation and
consumer welfare.'0 9 There might be rare exceptions, such as certain
monopolization cases, in which consumer harm is hard to measure, and
then harm to competitors may be examined as an indicator of consumer
harm. Indeed, harm to competitors does not play a central role in U.S.
merger policy, although it does motivate private antitrust litigation. Since
such competitor complaints are often at variance with consumer interests,
antitrust enforcement agencies and courts should view them skeptically. In
the European Union, the more significant and involved role of competitors
in the merger review process has created a perception by some that the
Commission's analysis is driven more by effects on competitors than is the
case in the United States."'
As the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee noted
in its final report to the Attorney General in 2000, "nations should
108 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 95.
109 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND THE CONSUMER (2001)
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/div-stats/9142.pdf (last visited April 29, 2002).
110 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 92, at 49; see
also JAMES S. VENIT & WILLIAM J. KOLASKY, Substantive Convergence, in ANTITRUST GOES
GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 88 (Simon J. Evenett et a]. eds., 2000).
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recognize that the interests of the competitors to the merging parties are
not necessarily aligned with consumer interests.""'1 Indeed, competitors
may oppose a merger precisely because it would create a more efficient
firm, one that will aggressively serve customers better than the existing
industry configuration. Blocking such acquisitions deprives the world of
an avenue to increased productivity.
D. Institutions for Policy Convergence
The United States and the European Union have already achieved
considerable cooperation and substantive convergence. U.S. and EU
antitrust authorities have come to similar conclusions about a large number
of transatlantic mergers." 2 More work is required, however. The United
States has undertaken several steps in bilateral and multilateral forums to
facilitate convergence of competition policy to serve efficiency ends.
1. Bilateral Enforcement Agreements
The United States has entered into bilateral cooperation agreements
with several important trading partners-Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Germany, Israel, Japan, Mexico, and the European Communities-to
facilitate antitrust enforcement." 3 These agreements are implemented by
the Justice Department and the FTC, working in cooperation with their
counterpart agencies in the other countries.' 14
These agreements typically provide for, among other things, sharing
of nonconfidential information, coordination of parallel investigations, and
positive comity. 15 Under positive comity, one country can request that
another investigate possibly anticompetitive practices in its jurisdiction
that adversely affect important interests of the country making the request.
Such a request does not require the country receiving the request to act,
nor does it preclude the country making the request from undertaking its
own enforcement. 1 6 The United States has also entered into one
11 1 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 95, at 63.
112 See MERIT E. JANOw, Transatlantic Cooperation on Competition Policy, in ANTITRUST
GOES GLOBAL, supra note 110, at 42-44.
113 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST COOPERATION AGREEMENTS, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/intemational/intarrangements.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2002),
114 See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Australia on Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance, Article I, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/intemational/docs/usaus7.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2002).
115 John J. Parisi, Speech at the Sixth Annual London Conference on EC Competition Law
(May 19, 1999).
116 See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding Cooperation Between Their Competition
Authorities in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws, Article IV, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/intemational/docs/3776.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2002).
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agreement, with Australia, under the International Antitrust Enforcement
Assistance Act, which, among other things, allows the enforcement
agencies to share confidential information."
17
The United States and the European Union have also created a
working group to identify and pursue areas of possible further convergence
in merger enforcement. Having completed a successful project on
remedies in merger cases, the working group has established new task
forces to examine conglomerate merger issues and other important
substantive and procedural topics.'
2. The International Competition Network
In October 2001, the Department of Justice and the FTC joined with
top foreign antitrust officials to launch the International Competition
Network ("ICN"). 1" 9 The ICN will provide a venue for senior antitrust
officials from around the world to work on reaching consensus on
appropriate procedural and substantive convergence in competition policy
enforcement. The ICN will initially focus on multijurisdictional merger
review (procedures, substantive analysis, and investigative techniques) and
the advocacy role of antitrust authorities in favoring pro-competitive
government policies. To facilitate the diffusion of best practices, the ICN
will develop nonbinding recommendations for consideration by individual
enforcement agencies. The ICN's interim steering group consists of
representatives from a cross section of developing and developed
countries, including the United States. It will hold its first conference in
the early fall of 2002.20
3. The World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") is an international
institution in which the United States negotiates agreements with 143 other
members to reduce barriers to trade.' 2' At the fourth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Doha, Qatar, in 2001, members adopted a ministerial
declaration. 22 That declaration included a statement that the Working
117 See supra note 114.
118 Alexander Schaub, Director General for Competition, Eur. Comm'n, Speech before EC
Merger Control 10th Anniversary Conference (Sept. 14-15, 2000), available at
http://europa.cu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2000 01 en.html (last visted Jan. 1, 2002).
119 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. and Foreign Antitrust Officials Launch
International Competition Network (Oct. 25, 2001) (on file with the Council of Economic Advisers).
120 See the discussion at www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/conference.html (last
visited Jan. 21, 2002).
121 See the discussion, "What is the WTO?", available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatise/whatise.htm. (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
122 WTO Ministerial Declaration adopted Nov. 14, 2001, available at http://www.wto.org/
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Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy will focus
on the clarification of core principles, modalities for voluntary
cooperation, and support for progressive reinforcement of competition
institutions in developing countries.' 23 The role of the WTO and other
international institutions in promoting economic well-being is detailed in
Chapter Seven of the 2002 Economic Report of the President.
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4. Benefits of Appropriate Convergence
In some cases, the lack of antitrust harmonization may yield benefits.
For example, in an unsettled policy area, in the absence of harmonization,
nations might experiment with different competition policies. The world
could then learn from these experiences what constitutes best practice in
antitrust enforcement in the area in question. The bilateral and multilateral
forums into which the United States has entered address this concern by
sharing information to promote best practices. This consultation will
enable the results of successful policy experiments to be disseminated.
Moreover, the United States remains committed to appropriate
convergence, in which efficient competition policies are spread worldwide,
rather than seeking harmonization for its own sake and potentially
promoting less than sound policies.
V. Dynamic Competition and Antitrust Policy
Through its influence on the development of competition policy over
the years, economic analysis has dramatically improved the ability of
government agencies and the courts to accurately judge the strength of
competition in a market. This has enhanced their capacity to distinguish
those cases that properly raise concerns about anticompetitive effects from
those that might have raised concerns in the past, but should no longer, in
light of a better understanding of competitive forces. These changes in
antitrust policy are important in that they afford firms greater flexibility to
lower costs and improve their products through adjustments to their
operations and organization.
But many of these improvements in policy have largely focused on
better understanding markets in which firms compete with one another
through incremental changes in the prices, quality, and quantity of
relatively similar products or services. In some increasingly prominent
english/the wto e/minist e/min01_e/mindec e.htm. (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
123 Id.
124 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (2002).
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industries, such as the information technology and pharmaceuticals
industries, another important form of competition is taking place. It arises
where there is a constant threat of innovations leading to a new or
improved product being introduced that is far superior to existing products
in a market. This type of competition is sometimes called competition for
the market, or dynamic competition.
125
The increasingly important role of innovations in our economy can be
seen in a number of indicators of innovative activity. After remaining
nearly unchanged during the 1970s, industry's funding of research and
development, measured as a share of GDP, grew two-thirds during the
following two decades, reaching 1.8% of GDP in 2000.126 The number of
patents granted each year by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
provides some indication of the rate at which patentable innovations are
being developed. Since the mid-1980s, the number of patents issued for
inventions each year has grown dramatically. 127 (See Figure 3.) Although
such a change could result from a number of other factors, such as
increased incentives to file for a patent based on adjustments to the legal
environment, evidence suggests that a burst in innovation is a driving
factor behind this rise. 128 Whereas some of the most visible innovations
contributing to dynamic competition are technological in nature, such as
improvements in the performance of computers, others may involve
changes in management or business practices.
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125 DAVID EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS IN DYNAMICALLY COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 8268, 2001).
126 See DIVISION OF SCIENCE RESOURCES STUDIES, NATIONAL PATTERNS OF R&D
RESOURCES (2001), available at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsfO1309/start.htm#intro (last visited Jan.
22, 2002).
127 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY, CALENDAR YEARS
1790-2000, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h-Counts.htm (last visited
Jan. 22, 2002).
128 See Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON. LIT.
1661 (1990); Samuel Kortum & Josh Lemer, Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What
is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting?, 48 CARNEGIE RES. CONF. SERIES ON PUB. POL'Y 247
(1998).
129 Langenfeld and Scheffman describe two examples of non-technological innovations: the
hub-and-spoke package delivery system developed by Federal Express and the development of the
modem supermarket. James Langenfeld & David Scheffman, Innovation and US. Competition Policy,
34 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1989).
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Figure 3. Industry-Funded Research and Development and
Patents Granted for Inventions.
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Both industry-funded research and development and the number of patents granted by the Patent
and Trademark Office have grown significantly since 1980.
Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis and Patent and Trademark
Office), National Science Foundation, and Council of Economic Advisers.
The importance of substantial innovations to the economy, as well as
the unique form of competition they bring about, was recognized in 1942
by the economist Joseph Schumpeter.13 ° He noted that a significant part of
the long-term growth of many industries resulted from what he called the
"perennial gale of creative destruction."' 31 At the heart of this creative
destruction is the introduction of new products or services, technologies, or
organizational forms that lead to dramatic changes in an industry's
structure or costs, or in the quality of its products or services. In
Schumpeter's view, it was periods of creative destruction that brought
"power production from the overshot water wheel to the modem power
plant . .. [and] transportation from the mailcoach to the airplane.'
32
Indeed, as he stated, the kind of competition resulting from firms bringing
forth these changes or innovations is one that "commands a decisive cost
or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits ...
130 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
131 Id. at 84.
132 Id. at 83.
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of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives."' 33
Because of his early insights, dynamic competition involving the
introduction of markedly improved goods or services is often referred to as
Schumpeterian competition.
The significance of innovation-and, hence, of dynamic
competition-will vary from market to market. It will be negligible in
some and a pervasive force in others. Product improvements are
commonly made in virtually all markets. But in markets experiencing the
kinds of substantial innovation that Schumpeter addressed, these
innovations can be so dramatic or disruptive as to make the products that
they improve upon significantly inferior in comparison. The benefits of
these innovations to society can be found all around us. Computer
processors produced today are, by one measure, more than 250 times more
powerful than those produced in 1980, and more than twice as powerful as
those produced in 1999.134 New drugs have vastly improved our ability to
treat various illnesses. Other examples abound.
It has long been recognized that particular incentives are necessary to
foster these market-transforming innovations. These innovations are often
the result of substantial research and development investments on the part
of companies or individuals. Since these investments must be made before
it is clear that any profitable innovations will come of them, they are
fundamentally risky. Encouraging innovation rests upon an interrelated set
of internal and external rewards. The external rewards are those provided
in the marketplace to the successful innovating organization. The internal
rewards are those provided by the firm, joint venture, or other governance
structure. Both economic organization and public policy therefore play
significant roles in encouraging innovation.
A. Sources of Incentives for Innovation
The external risks and rewards facing firms in innovation-intensive
industries are highlighted by a preliminary study of firms in the computer
software industry between 1990 and 1998, which found that success, as
measured by sales growth over this period, was by no means certain .
35
But, compensating for this risk, some firms that did end up being
successful were extremely so. At least ten percent of firms saw sales fall to
zero, and at least half experienced negative sales growth over the period.
133 Id. at 84.
134 See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, 1999 ANN. REP. 8 (2000); Press Release, Intel
Corp., Intel Processors Deliver Leading-Edge Processing Power for Applied Computing Solutions,
Jan. 21, 2002.
135 See Josh Lemer, The Returns to Investments in Innovative Activities: An Overview and
Analysis of the Software Industry (Sept. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Council of
Economic Advisers).
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Only 25% of firms experienced real annualized sales growth of at least 7%
during the period. But about 1% experienced real annualized growth of
greater than 130%. This pattern of success highlights the risk involved in
investments in these innovation-intensive industries. Therefore firms must
have reason to expect that, taking into account the likelihood of failure, the
profits from any successful innovations that do result from their efforts
will be enough to justify the initial investment.
1. Intellectual Property Protection
Not only is investing in efforts to develop innovations risky and often
expensive, but the innovations that result often produce beneficial
knowledge or insights that others can copy at relatively low cost.
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Furthermore, in the absence of laws to the contrary, knowledge embodied
in an innovation can be hard to keep others from using.
For instance, the research and development costs incurred by a firm in
determining the correct chemical composition and treatment regime for a
particular drug therapy may be substantial. But it may be difficult to keep
much of this information out of the hands of competitors that have not
borne any of these costs, yet could use that information to produce the new
drug themselves. As a result, competition between the innovator and
imitators could keep the price of the drug at the cost of manufacturing it.
In such a competitive environment, a firm's profits from its innovation
would not suffice to cover its original research and development costs or
justify its decision to risk undertaking expensive research efforts that may
bear no fruit. Foreseeing this potential outcome, the innovator would have
little incentive to embark on the research and development in the first
place.
Even if a firm did not face competition from other firms benefiting
from the knowledge produced by its innovation, firms or individuals may
use aspects of the innovation for other purposes. Given how difficult it can
be to keep them from doing this, in the absence of laws to prevent it, the
innovator may receive little compensation from those that benefit from its
innovation. As a result, the rewards that a firm enjoys from its innovation
could fall far short of the benefits that the innovation produces for society.
Consequently, in many cases, firms or individuals might not embark on
developing an innovation because, although the social benefit from it may
136 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 123, at 7. For an overview of intellectual
property and antitrust issues, see Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission,
Competition and Intellectual Property Policy: The Way Ahead, Address before the American Bar
Association Antitrust Fall Forum (Nov. 15, 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/intellectual.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2002).
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be large enough to justify its development costs, the firm or individual
could not expect to reap enough of that benefit to justify those costs.
The consequences of this problem were recognized in the U.S.
Constitution, which empowered Congress to develop a body of intellectual
property laws, including those establishing patents. 137 A patent for an
invention confers on an individual or firm (the patentholder) limited rights
to exclude others from making, selling, or using the invention without the
patentholder's consent.138 Patents generally are granted for twenty years,
and as the rights they provide imply, the patentholder can license to other
individuals or firms the right to use its innovation. Patents give a firm the
legal power to keep others from using its innovation to create competing
products without bearing the cost of the innovation. Licensing provides a
means whereby the innovator can receive compensation, in the form of
licensing fees, from others that find a beneficial use for the innovation.
Thus, policy has long recognized that, to encourage innovation, firms must
expect that successful innovations will yield a market position that allows
them to earn profits adequate to compensate for the risk and cost of their
efforts.
Indeed, intellectual property protection often plays an important role
in dynamically competitive markets. But it is not the only mechanism that
may allow a firm to gain an adequate return on risky investments in
developing innovations. Intellectual property laws cannot always provide
inventors complete protection against competitors using the knowledge
embodied in their inventions without compensation. First, even if they are
valuable, not all innovations can be protected by intellectual property law.
Second, firms can often "invent around" a patent to create a competing
product that, although similar in value to consumers, is different enough in
its composition or features so as not to violate the patent. Although this
entails some development costs, these may be substantially reduced by the
knowledge gained from studying the original innovator's efforts. On the
other hand, some innovations may be difficult enough to imitate that, even
without intellectual property protection, the innovator can enjoy a
substantial cost or quality advantage over its competitors for some
period. 39 In either case, other characteristics of some dynamically
competitive industries are important in making it likely that a successful
innovation will yield a firm the leading position in a market, and profits
that are essential to encourage such innovations.
137 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, c|. 8.
138 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING
PATENTS, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
139 Levin et al. found that the R&D costs of duplicating a major unpatented new product
exceeded fifty percent of the original innovator's R&D costs in eighty-six percent of one hundred
twenty-seven industries surveyed. Richard Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial
Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 809 (1987).
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2. Economies of Scale
Many industries that may experience dynamic competition are
characterized by substantial economies of scale. In such industries,
creating a new product entails high fixed costs, such as the costs of
research and development and of setting up production and distribution
facilities. But, once these costs have been incurred, the incremental cost of
making each unit of the product is small, indeed, sometimes close to zero,
and it is often easy to expand production to high levels. In markets with
these characteristics, an innovator may be able to introduce its new product
and keep production levels high enough to gain substantial market share
before others can offer products of competing quality. As a result,
economies of scale may allow the innovator to keep its average costs well
below those of new entrants offering similar products that have smaller
initial market shares. In some cases, this advantage may be enough to keep
other firms from providing significant competition unless they can offer a
product that is notably superior.
3. Network Effects
Network effects are another mechanism that can help an innovator
maintain a market-leading position in many dynamically competitive
industries. A product or service is subject to network effects if its value to
a consumer increases the more it is used by others. For instance, over the
past decade, the number of people using e-mail has grown dramatically,
making it a much more valuable means of communication for any
individual user today than it was a decade ago. Network effects can also
influence the value of some computer software. The more people who use
a particular software application, or at least software compatible with it,
the more valuable that software is to any individual who wants to share or
exchange files with others who use that software. One study of prices of
spreadsheet software between 1986 and 1991 found that consumers were
willing to pay a significant premium for software that was compatible with
Lotus 1-2-3, which was the dominant spreadsheet program during this
period.
140
As more people use a particular good, its value to consumers can also
increase because this wider use encourages the production of
complementary goods. For instance, as more offices use a particular type
of photocopier, businesses offering repair services and spare parts for that
140 See Neil Gandal, Hedonic Price Indexes for Spreadsheets and an Empirical Test for
Network Externalities, 25 RAND J. ECON. 160 (1994).
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copier may become more common, making the copier even more attractive
to offices.
As a result of these network effects, the value that consumers attach
to a product that is already widely used may be substantially greater than
the value they place on a relatively similar product that is used by fewer
people. For instance, a manufacturer may introduce a new copier that
offers performance largely similar to that of the market leader. But if the
new copier is built in such a way that users cannot draw from the same
service and spare parts network, it may be less valuable than the
incumbent product. Thus, if a firm can quickly gain market share after
introducing a new innovation, network effects can play an important role
in helping the firm maintain that market leadership in the face of
competition from new entrants offering similar products. This, in turn,
increases its ability to reap the profits that are necessary for it to earn an
adequate return on its risky investment.
Many have expressed concern that network effects can give such
substantial advantages to incumbent products that new firms with
potentially superior products are unable to compete. In theory, this could
happen, but it does not happen necessarily. If a new product is clearly
superior to the leading product, whether network effects are large enough
to keep the new product from successfully competing will depend on the
value of those effects compared with the net advantages it offers after
taking into account the cost of switching to it. But, of course, measuring
either of these-the value of the network effects or that of the new
product's superior features-is difficult.
Although there have been cases where a new product took over a
market-leading position from one that presumably enjoyed network
effects, conclusive evidence that network effects have prevented the
widespread adoption of a markedly superior product has not yet been
found.14' For example, one common case put forward to argue that
network effects can hinder the entry of superior products is that of the
QWERTY keyboard, the familiar, century-old keyboard arrangement that
virtually all typewriters used and that most computer terminals use today.
In the 1980s, a study suggested that a keyboard arrangement called the
Dvorak keyboard, introduced in the 1930s by August Dvorak, was superior
to QWERTY but had failed to gain market share because of the network
effects that the already-established QWERTY enjoyed. 142 Yet, a more
recent study raises significant doubts about claims that the Dvorak
141 Evans and Schmalensee provide several examples of new innovations displacing existing
products that enjoyed network effects. For instance, CDs displaced records, IBM PCs displaced Apple
Hs, and Visa and MasterCard displaced Diners Club, the first charge card. See David Evans & Richard
Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Networks, 10 ANTITRUST MAG. 36 (1996).
142 See Paul David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 332 (1985).
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keyboard was superior. 143 For instance, the most dramatic claims of its
superiority are traceable to research by Dvorak himself, who stood to gain
financially from the patented keyboard's success. Examination of his
research revealed that experiments comparing keyboards often failed to
account for differences in the ability and experience of participating
typists. The best-documented experiments, as well as recent ergonomic
studies, suggest little or no advantage for the Dvorak keyboard. This
highlights that generalizations cannot be made about the significance of
network effects in deterring the entry of superior products into a market.
Their impact must be judged on a case-by-case basis.
B. Fostering Innovation Through Organizational Structure
Although the prospect of gaining a market-leading position can
encourage firms to innovate, firms can reap the benefits of innovation
through other means as well. As was mentioned above, the benefits of
innovation are often shared by many. Licensing agreements offer one
means by which a firm can capture some of these spillovers. But such
arrangements are an imperfect way of ensuring that innovators benefit
from the spillover effects of their innovations while also encouraging
additional beneficial uses of the innovation by others. As noted earlier,
addressing this spillover problem is one motivation for a research joint
venture among firms that expect to mutually gain from an innovation.
Moreover, firms that develop new innovations subject to network effects
will benefit from the production of complementary products that enhance
those network effects. Partial equity stakes may provide a useful
mechanism to foster the development of these complementary products.
Even when conducted within a single firm, successful research
requires appropriate effort from multiple parties. This includes not only the
work of research scientists and engineers, but also efforts by managers to
craft an organizational structure that attracts and rewards such personnel
appropriately. Thus, successful innovating firms must address various
agency costs in product discovery and development to align the interests of
these various participants with those of the firm.
For example, one study indicates that research programs in
pharmaceutical companies that encourage publication by their scientists
experience higher rates of drug discovery. 44 Whereas stock options are
often the focus of discussions about means of resolving agency costs, this
example makes clear that incentives must be carefully tailored to the
143 See S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. I
(1990).
144 Rebecca Henderson & lain Cockburn, Measuring Competence? Exploring Firm Effects
in Drug Discovery, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 63 (1994).
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desired objective. In this case, keeping a firm's researchers closely
connected to leading-edge developments in fundamental science may
provide a critical advantage in developing commercially valuable drugs.
Thus, just as firms can use stock options as an incentive for managers to
pursue shareholders' interests, so, too, they can create incentives for
researchers to be connected to developments at the leading edge of their
science, by making a researcher's standing in the greater scientific
community a significant factor in promotion decisions. A further study
suggests that these firms provide a balanced system of incentives: those
firms that use a scientist's publication record as a positive factor in
promotion are also more aggressive in rewarding research teams that
produce important patents.1 45 This reward structure helps direct scientists'
efforts to engage in both basic and applied research, culminating in
successful drug discoveries.
Decisionmaking at all levels of a firm can play an important role in
determining its success in introducing substantial new innovations. A
study of the computer hard disk drive industry found that established firms
often had the technological know-how to develop what would turn out to
be the next disruptive technology in their market, such as the 3.5-inch disk
drive. 146 In fact, they were sometimes among the first to develop them. But
new entrants were always the leaders in commercializing the disruptive
technologies examined in this study.
In this industry, the failure of incumbents to lead in commercializing
disruptive innovations was often traced to decisionmaking that focused on
the needs of their established market, failing to promote new technologies
whose initial applications fell outside that market. Yet it would be these
technologies that would eventually develop to become the leader in the
established market. Thus the organizational structure and incentives faced
by managers of established firms played a more important role than
technological know-how in their failure to lead the commercialization of
disruptive innovations. Of course, innovation benefits society whether it
arises from established or from entrant firms, but in either case, successful
innovation requires good organization.
C. Dynamic Competition as Repeated Innovations
All the factors we have examined-the market-transforming nature of
some innovations, the presence of intellectual property protection, the
145 laIN COCKBURN, REBECCA HENDERSON & SCOTT STERN, BALANCING INCENTIVES: THE
TENSION BETWEEN BASIC AND APPLIED RESEARCH (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 6882, 1999).
146 See CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997).
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potential for economies of scale, and the presence of network effects-
provide explanations for why a firm can gain a market-leading position
and earn high profits after introducing an innovation. But what makes a
market subject to dynamic competition is the fact that the very same
factors can allow another firm, with an even greater innovation, to take
much or all of the market away from the leading firm. Indeed, as Joseph
Schumpeter commented, the competition provided by new innovations
"acts not only when in being but also when it is merely an ever-present
threat. It disciplines before it attacks. The businessman feels himself to be
in a competitive situation even if he is alone in his field.
147
1. The Market for Personal Digital Assistants
One example of a market where dynamic competition prevails today
is that for personal digital assistants ("PDAs"). 48 Apple Computer, Inc.,
made substantial investments to develop the Newton, the first handheld
PDA, which it introduced in 1993. This product did not succeed, but by
1996 at least six firms had operating systems for handheld PDAs either in
development or already available to consumers. The Palm Operating
System soon emerged as the preferred PDA, with a 73% market share in
1998. Although the innovations embodied in its products have made Palm
a leader in this market, it is losing market share to new PDAs.
49
This example demonstrates a number of the elements often found in
markets undergoing rapid innovation. First, firms that make substantial
upfront investments in product development do not always experience the
success necessary to gain an adequate return on those investments. Second,
significant innovations can make a product the clear leader in a market at a
particular point in time. Finally, even these innovative market leaders face
challenges from later innovations by other firms that have the potential to
make the leader's product obsolete. Therefore a potential innovator must
believe that, if it gains a market-leading position through innovation, the
resulting profits will be adequate to justify the development costs, given
not only the possibility of failure, but also the likelihood that future
innovations will make any market leadership short-lived.
147 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 129, at 85.
148 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 123.
149 See Rick Perera, Compaq Prepares to Claim PDA Lead, IDG NEWS SERVICE, June 18,
2001.
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2. Case Study: Dynamic Competition in the Market for Prescription
Anti-Ulcer Drugs
The dramatic nature of innovations in the drug industry can give a
firm that introduces a new drug significant market share. But subsequent,
equally dramatic innovations by competitors can make this market
leadership short-lived. Such leapfrog leadership is one characteristic of
markets subject to dynamic competition.
As an example, in 1977, SmithKline introduced the first anti-ulcer
prescription drug, Tagamet. °50 Just six years later, however, Glaxo plc
introduced a competing drug called Zantac."'5 Compared with Tagamet,
Zantac had fewer adverse interactions with other drugs and needed to be
taken only twice rather than four times a day.' 52 Within a year, on a
revenue basis, Zantac had gained more than a quarter of the market for
prescription anti-ulcer drugs, and, by 1989, that share had risen to more
than half while Tagamet's had fallen to about a quarter. 1' (See Figure 4.)
In 1989, Merck & Co., Inc., introduced a drug, developed by Astra
AB, called Prilosec, the first of a new class of anti-ulcer drugs called
proton pump inhibitors. 54 The new drug had to be taken only once a day.
Also, studies have shown that it heals a greater percentage of patients than
Zantac does in a 4-week period. 155 By 1998, Prilosec accounted for about
half of total sales revenue for prescription anti-ulcer drugs, while Zantac's
share of sales revenue had fallen to about five percent. 156 (In the wake of
mergers and other developments, the names of the firms that sell all three
drugs have changed.)
This example demonstrates the rapid rate of innovation in the drug
industry and how it can quickly render obsolete even highly innovative
drugs that companies have spent hundreds of millions of dollars
developing. In such a competitive environment, patents play an essential
role in encouraging firms to spend the huge resources needed to develop
ideas and products that competitors could easily copy in the absence of
legal protection.
150 See Ernst Bemdt, Davina Ling & Margaret Kyle, The Long Shadow of Patent Expiration:
Do Rx to OTC Switches Provide an Afterlife?, forthcoming in SCANNER DATA AND PRICE INDEXES
(Robert Feenstra & Matthew Shapiro eds., 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/books/criwO0/.
(last visited Apr. 29, 2002).
151 See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 123.
152 See ERNST BERNDT, ROBERT PINDYCK & PIERRE AZOULAY, CONSUMPTION
EXTERNALITIES AND DIFFUSION IN PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS: ANTIULCER DRUGS (Nat'] Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7772, 2000).
153 E-mail from IMS Health Incorporated, to Council of Economic Advisers (Dec. 21, 2001)
(on file with Council of Economic Advisers).
154 See Bemdt, Ling & Kyle, supra note 150.
155 See PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2002, at 629 (56th ed. 2002).
156 See e-mail from IMS Health Incorporated, supra note 153.
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Figure 4. Sales Revenue of
Selected Prescription Anti-Ulcer Drugs.
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The rise and fall of sales revenue for these three anti-ulcer drugs reflects how dynamic
competition can lead to substantial success but can also make that success short-lived.
Source: IMS Health Incorporated
This example also shows that, even with a patent, a firm can see its
market share taken away by another firm that develops an even better drug
for the same illness or condition. In this example, Prilosec was introduced
into the market well before Zantac's patent expired. Given the substantial
upfront investments in drug research and development, companies will be
motivated to develop drugs only if successful drugs can achieve high
profits and capture a leading market share in the relatively short time
before new innovations emerge. In the drug industry, substantial market
share can easily be lost in just a few years.
D. Implications of Dynamic Competition for Competition Policy
Competition policy also has a role to play in markets characterized by
dynamic competition. Markets experiencing rapid or substantial innovation
can still be subject to conditions or behavior by firms that hinder
competition. For instance, price fixing among firms will harm competition
even in industries undergoing dramatic innovation. Other behavior may
have more ambiguous implications for competition, dynamic or otherwise.
Therefore, the antitrust agencies will continue to scrutinize behavior by
firms in these markets. Since the lawfulness of certain actions by a firm
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depends, in part, on the degree of competition in the firm's market, the
ability to properly assess all types of competition is essential.
Consequently, the analytical framework used to assess competition must
encompass its potentially dynamic dimension. This involves recognizing
the shortcomings of traditional methods for assessing competition when
applied to markets undergoing rapid innovation, and developing new
methods for determining how significant dynamic competition is in a
particular market.
Highlighting the importance of developing and applying such
methods is the fact that markets characterized by significant dynamic
competition may not appear competitive through the lens of some common
tools of traditional competition policy. Thus, continuing adjustments in
competition policy are needed to avoid incorrect conclusions. Likewise,
continuing adjustments are needed to correctly identify markets in which
high profits and market leadership cannot be explained by the ongoing
nature or pace of innovation, suggesting that the market may indeed not be
competitive.
As noted in the discussion of merger policy above, a market's degree
of concentration is typically used as a screening mechanism to evaluate
competition in that market. Although finding that a market is highly
concentrated does not, by itself, suffice to conclude that competition is
limited, finding that it is not highly concentrated usually does suffice to
allay any such concern. Thus, measures of concentration provide a useful
screen because many markets may not be concentrated enough to warrant
further investigation.
However, given the significant role of innovation in markets
characterized by dynamic competition, it is common to see one leading
firm that, through innovation, has for the time being created a superior
product. Although such a market would be highly concentrated, there may,
in fact, be substantial dynamic competition in the market, with new
innovations emerging to threaten the leading firm's position.
Consequently, because many markets undergoing rapid innovation will
have a high measured concentration, such measurements may not be as
useful a screening device if dynamic competition is the primary form of
competition in that industry. In light of this shortcoming, the development
of effective screening mechanisms to evaluate dynamic competition may
be a useful supplement to concentration measures. Such screening
mechanisms could allow businesses in innovative industries to better
predict the responses of antitrust agencies to their actions, just as the safe
harbor provisions relating to concentration measures did in the 1980s.
In assessing competition in a market, antitrust agencies and the courts
also examine whether the threat of entry by a firm into that market would
be both likely to occur and sufficient to counteract any ability of existing
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firms to exercise significant market power. However, for it to be adequate
to assuage concerns, entry in response to such behavior must generally be
able to take place within a period of two years, essentially ensuring that the
incumbent firm or firms' ability to profitably raise prices is only that
durable.'57 As the length of patents indicates, firms may need substantially
more than two years for profits to provide an adequate return on their
research and development investments. Moreover, in a typical assessment
of the impact of a merger on competition, the threat of entry can be viewed
as adequate to counteract anticompetitive price increases if it would
prevent the merging firms from keeping prices significantly above
premerger levels. But, as Schumpeter pointed out, even if they may take
longer than a few years to emerge, innovations in dynamically competitive
markets may not only reduce incumbents' profits that are above
competitive levels, but indeed threaten the very viability of incumbent
companies. Such competition surely threatens the durability of a firm's
market power.
Some common tools of antitrust policy may thus be less complete and
informative in dynamically competitive markets than in other situations.
But, just as the antitrust agencies improved on simple concentration
measures in assessing competition during the late 1970s and early 1980s,
so, too, the existing toolkit can be further augmented to deal with dynamic
competition. The central role of innovation in these markets suggests the
kind of information that is useful in assessing this type of competition.
In general, antitrust enforcement must continue the effort to
understand the patterns, nature, and pace of innovation in a given market.
In established industries, the antitrust agencies and the courts can examine
firm and industry history to assess the significance of innovative activities.
These activities would include research and development expenditures and
complementary investments in production or distribution that would have
much less value if the product they support lost its market to a
competitor's innovation. The risky investments associated with developing
innovations go well beyond research and development to include all
investments that future innovations could render obsolete.
An industry's history can also provide indications of the fragility of
market leadership to substantial innovations in that industry. For instance,
the history of innovations in the market for prescription anti-ulcer drugs,
reviewed above, suggests that the threat of future innovations will remain
an important competitive force. Where such threats are important, one
might conclude that the industry is dynamically competitive.
Brand-new industries, of course, lack such a history. Nonetheless,
antitrust officials should still endeavor to assess the importance of
157 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 42, § 3.
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innovative activity in these markets, and thus the potential significance of
dynamic competition. For both new and old markets, the potential for
competition from developments in other rapidly innovating fields should
also be considered-even if the technologies of the respective fields are
fundamentally different-as long as the application of those technologies
is converging. For instance, vascular grafts are used today to repair and
replace diseased or damaged blood vessels. But any assessment of
competition in that market must take into account the potential for
substantial innovations in other invasive procedures or in drug therapies
that could either reduce the incidence of diseased or damaged blood
vessels or provide alternative treatments."'8 In both new and established
industries, we must encourage dynamic competition and the benefits of
innovation it secures, by updating competition policy appropriately.
Such updating has already taken place with respect to the scope of
intellectual property protection and the effect it might have on other firms'
abilities to innovate. Although intellectual property protection is important
to encourage firms to innovate, it can also be used in ways that hinder the
development of future, and potentially competing, innovations by other
firms. The FTC and the Justice Department have addressed this possibility
in guidelines that recognize the interaction between intellectual property
law and antitrust law.159 These guidelines encourage the development of
new technologies and the improvement of existing ones, while seeking to
preserve the desired incentives underlying the creation of intellectual
property.
Conclusion
Antitrust policy has contributed greatly to the economy by fostering
competition and allowing the efficient adaptation of markets to new
opportunities. This Article has showcased some recent changes in the
organization of economic activity and market competition and outlined the
adjustments that competition policy is making in response.
First, corporate governance and structure continue to evolve, as the
rapid pace of merger activity proceeds and hybrid organizational forms,
such as joint ventures and partial equity stakes, continue to be established.
Competition policy should be sensitive to the efficiencies that new
structures have brought and can continue to bring to society. Since a large
source of these efficiencies may be rooted in managerial and
158 Pleatsikas and Teece point out this example in Christopher Pleatsikas & David Teece,
The Analysis of Market Definition and Market Power in the Context of Rapid Innovation, I INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 15 (2000).
159 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995).
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organizational improvements, it is worthwhile for the enforcement
agencies to investigate such factors thoroughly.
Second, the growth of multinational enterprises and cross-border
mergers will continue to make more goods and services available to
consumers at lower cost. But possible anticompetitive concerns arising out
of such mergers can now result in reviews by antitrust authorities from
many nations. The application of inefficient competition policies
worldwide could harm U.S. interests. The United States is working to
narrow divergences in countries' competition law and policy through
cooperation with other national antitrust authorities, under a number of
bilateral cooperation agreements. Through the creation of the International
Competition Network, the United States has joined with other nations to
facilitate procedural and substantive convergence.
Finally, competition policy in the United States and abroad must
address the greater prominence of markets characterized by dynamic
competition. Competition policy should take into account that
characteristics, such as high profits and substantial market share, that
might warrant concern about competition in some markets may mask
vigorous dynamic competition among firms in innovation-intensive
markets.

